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ON REFUSING TO DEAL WITH RIVALS
Glen 0. Robinsont
This Article examines refusals to deal with competitive rivals as an
antitrust offense. It claims that refusals to deal should be eliminated as a
separate violation except in the unique case of essential facilities. This Arti-
cle first examines the confusing distinction between singlefirm and group
refusals, and concludes that both should be adjudicated under the same lia-
bility rule. The misunderstanding about the standards of liability as between
concerted and singlefirm refusals pales beside a larger confusion about why
refusals to deal are an antitrust offense at all. The Supreme Court has of-
fered neither a theory nor a coherent standard requiring a dominant firm to
deal with rivals. This Article argues that the essential facilities doctrine
presents a duty to deal framework that is both coherent and limited. There
remain, however, a number of vexing issues concerning the doctrine's scope
and application, as illustrated by two on-going controversies in communica-
tions law involving competitors' access to dominant firm facilities.
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1178
I. THE LiUmn'T STANDARD FOR COLLECTIVE AND SINGLE-
FIRM REFUSALS .......................................... 1184
I. COMPETING WrrhouT APOLOGY .......................... 1189
III. LET'S (NOT) MAKE A DEAL .............................. 1194
IV. SHARING NECESSITIES .................................... 1204
A. Evolution ........................................... 1204
B. Elements and Issues ................................ 1207
1. Denial of Use .................................... 1208
2. Essential Facility ................................. 1209
3. M onopoly ........................................ 1212
4. Feasibility of Sharing ............................. 1216
C. Essential Facilities on the Information
Superhighway ...................................... 1217
1. Access to Local Telephone Exchange Networks ....... 1217
2. Sharing Broadband Internet Access ................. 1223
3. Network Effects and Access ........................ 1227
CONCLUSION ................................................... 1230
t David A. Harrison Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. My
thanks to Ken Abraham, Curt Bradley, Joe Brodley, George Cohen, Charlie Goetz, John
Harrison, Ed Kitch, Doug Leslie, Clarisa Long, Paul Mahoney, Jon Rose, Greg Sidak, Paul
Stephan, and Rip Verkerke, and to participants in workshops at the University of Virginia,
the American Enterprise Institute, and the Federal Trade Commission for comments.
1177
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
According to a longstanding declaration of antitrust law, any
firm-even one with monopoly power-may deal with whomever, and
on such terms as, it chooses.' Like so many declarations in law, this
doctrine quickly wilts under challenge, much as Captain Corcoran's
claim of sea-hardiness in H.M.S. Pinafore.
CAPT.: .. . I am never known to quail
At the furry of a gale,
And I'm never, never sick at sea!
ALL: What, never?
CAPT.: No, never!
ALL: What, never?
CAPT.: Hardly ever.2
Even the "hardly ever" qualification overstates the matter, however. A
duty to deal may be an exception, but it is an exception of fairly inde-
terminate scope. It would be a closer approximation to say not
"never" nor "hardly ever," but rather "it all depends."
On what? That too is not very well specified. Refusals to deal
make many appearances in antitrust law. Because they are means to
ends, their appearance is as varied as the end purposes themselves. 3
Indeed, nearly all antitrust conduct can be characterized as a refusal
to deal. Thus, price fixing is essentially a refusal to deal except on the
basis of an artificially set price, tying involves a refusal to deal except
on the basis of artificially bundled separate products, and so on. In
such cases the refusal element is not independently pulling any
weight, so giving it separate attention adds confusion to the underly-
ing conduct issues. Unfortunately, adding confusion is not itself an
antitrust offense, so the practice of loose characterization proceeds
undeterred. 4
I The no-duty rule is at least as old as United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919), and has since been frequently reaffirmed, albeit primarily in dictum. See, e.g., East-
man Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 n.32 (1992) (observing
that a monopolist may refuse to deal with its competitors "if there are legitimate competi-
tive reasons for the refusal").
2 W.S. GILBERT, H.M.S. Pinafore, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 99,
105 (Random House 1936) (1878).
3 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 207-08 (1976)
(emphasizing that the legality of group refusals to deal depends on their end purpose,
which may be used to either enhance or undermine competition).
4 For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979), plaintiff characterized defendants' blanket licenses as a concerted refusal to deal,
as well as a price-fixing violation, and an illegal tying arrangement even though the ele-
ments of the alleged refusal were contained in the other claims. See id. at 6.
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Because refusals to deal occur in such a variety of contexts and
may serve a variety of malign or benign purposes,5 it is arguable
whether refusals, as such, should be treated as a discrete antitrust of-
fense. However, this Article's concern is not the refusal to deal char-
acterization across the range of antitrust offenses; rather, it is
concerned with refusals to deal specifically with competitors. In cases
involving competitors, the refusal claim often stands alone as the con-
duct element. Here the element of refusal not only drives the result,
but also propels it in the wrong direction insofar as cooperative deal-
ing undermines the competitive rivalries that antitrust laws are in-
tended to promote.
Part I of this Article attempts to clarify the liability standard for
refusals to deal, a matter which has long been confused by the dichot-
omy between concerted refusals and refusals by single-firm monopo-
lists. At one time the former were considered per se illegal, even
though the latter have never been. In the mid-1980s, the Supreme
Court seemingly abandoned the per se rule for concerted refusals in
general, but preserved an exception for cases involving market power
or control of an element essential for competition.6 While this ap-
proach suggests that some residue of per se illegality remains, this can-
not make sense. Single-firm refusals have never been judged by a per
se rule even when they involved market power or control of an essen-
tial facility, and there is no basis for supposing that concerted refusals
are inherently more harmful than single-firm refusals. The fact that
concerted and single-firm conduct implicate two different sections of
the Sherman Act7 might warrant classifying these cases separately, but
it furnishes no reason to treat them as distinctive harms. Setting aside
the element of agreement, the underlying substantive standard of
harmfulness should be the same, and in both cases that means appli-
cation of the rule of reason.
This bit of doctrinal housecleaning serves mainly to introduce the
more profound question of whether, in any form, refusals to deal
should be considered a discrete antitrust offense. Part II addresses
this question by exploring the underlying premise for the supposed
baseline rule of no duty to deal with competitors. This precept has a
mantra-like quality that does not invite explanation. Perhaps the rea-
sons for the no-duty rule are so obvious that they need no explana-
tion. However, even the obvious needs to be repeated every once in a
while lest it be overlooked. In this spirit, the obvious point of the no-
5 Unilateral refusals to deal are categorized in Kenneth L. Glazer & Abbott B. Lipsky,
Jr., Unilateral Refusals to Deal Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 63 AN-rrRusT LJ. 749,
766-800 (1995).
6 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 296 (1985).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2002] 1179
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
duty rule is that an obligation to deal with competitors is inconsistent
with a conception of competition as independent rivalry.
Unfortunately, antitrust law seems to be conflicted about its con-
ception of competition. There are two ways to think about competi-
tion. One way is to invoke the model in which a large number of
small producers act autonomously to determine their output. Call
this the "farm model" after the fashion of traditional introductory eco-
nomics textbooks which use farmers to illustrate perfect competition.8
In this scheme, the output of each producer is so small that it cannot
affect price, and cooperative action among firms is defeated by the
rules of the game (i.e., antitrust law) and by the composition of the
market, which has too many producers to make group action sustaina-
ble. The farm model describes competition in the sense that the mar-
ket produces competitive results, but it does not imply that producers
act in a self-consciously competitive way; the structure of the market
naturally induces them to act competitively. In contrast to the farm
model is the model of rivalrous competition. This model assumes that
individual producers still do not control enough of the market to de-
termine prices, but that the number of producers is small enough and
their market shares large enough for each to perceive competition as
a strategic game aimed at best known rivals.9 In the introductory text-
books this is sometimes described as "imperfect" or "monopolistic"
competition, 10 though these terms carry baggage that is not important
here. Significantly, this second model is the only form of competition
that is relevant to antitrust. Antitrust law is not needed to keep farm-
ers "competing," because they cannot help but do so-unless they get
a little help from their government friends.11 Thus, antitrust law is
only needed to enforce rivalrous behavior, not to transform rivalrous
markets into farmers' markets.
Rivalrous competition is a zero-sum game. Joseph Schumpeter
famously called it a process of "[c]reative [d]estruction," with rivals
seeking to kill off their competitors. 12 Antitrust law has always been
uncomfortable with Schumpeter's taste for competitive rivalry, which
is red in tooth and claw. In part, this may be attributable to antitrust
8 See, e.g., RICHARD G. LIPSEY & PETER 0. STEINER, ECONOMICS 213-15 (5th ed. 1978)
(contrasting wheat farmers and automobile manufacturers).
9 See id. at 250-52.
10 See, e.g., id. at 253.
11 The most obvious example of such help is government approved and enforced
agricultural marketing agreements under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7
U.S.C. § 1340 (2000). See, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 352 (1984)
(precluding consumer challenges to a milk marketing order issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture that was intended to raise milk prices because consumer groups were not
within the class of persons Congress intended to benefit).
12 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (Harper Colo-
phon ed., 1976) (1942).
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law's shorter time horizon as compared with the lengthier temporal
scale that implicitly underlies Schumpeter's view of competition.
Schumpeter was not concerned with firms that achieved monopoly
status by acting aggressively to kill off rivals, for in a dynamic econ-
omy, monopolies are always being destroyed by other aspiring
monopolists.' 3
Antitrust enforcement, however, is driven primarily by a short
time horizon. The legality of particular commercial conduct is either
assessed on the basis of its intrinsic badness (per se illegal) or its proba-
ble effects (rule of reason). This assessment is typically cabined by a
short-run perspective that permits little if any consideration of the
general character of the industry, the longer-term movement of
competitive forces within the particular market, and so on.14 This par-
ticularized focus is not all bad; a longer-term perspective risks trans-
forming the system of common law adjudication into a system of
industrial planning, and making courts regulatory agencies. And it is
no easy matter to determine the appropriate temporal period in
which to view the effects of a particular practice. On the one hand, a
Schumpeterian perspective teaches that in the long run, the effects of
anticompetitive practices dissipate in the face of enduring market
forces. On the other hand, one needs to remember Keynes's famous
quip about those market forces: "In the long run we are all dead."'15
Asking enforcement agents and courts to calibrate precisely between
the ephemeral and the eternal may be asking too much.
Undoubtedly, though, the present focus on discrete conduct
threatens to conflate ephemeral and insignificant business conduct
with durable and important economic harm. In truth, most antitrust
cases more closely resemble tort actions than public enforcement ac-
tions. I suppose one could not reasonably expect otherwise given that
antitrust enforcement is overwhelmingly dominated by private
claims.' 6 These private claims are typically filed by competitors, which
lends another anti-Schumpeterian bias to antitrust. Modern antitrust
13 Id. (remarking that "we are dealing with a process whose every element takes con-
siderable time in revealing its true features and ultimate effects").
14 There are exceptions. The modem approach to predation adopts a "long view" in
evaluating the probability that pricing below cost will inflict long-term injury on consum-
ers. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 234
(1993) (requiring that courts consider possibility of recoupment of lost profits after preda-
tory behavior eliminates competition); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 590-91 (1986).
15 JOHN MAYNARD Kmws, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).
16 Since 1975, private antitrust cases have accounted for more than 80% of all cases
filed each year, ranging from a low of 83.4% (in 1990) to a high of 95.6% (in 1976).
BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUSTCE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJuS-
TICE STATISTICS 451 tbl.5.37 (2000), available at http://vww.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/
pdf/t537.pdf.
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courts and scholars may endlessly proclaim that their sole concern is
harm to competition, and not competitors,' 7 but the evidence from
some decisions suggests that they only half believe it.18 Moreover,
even if this conviction were absolute, a selection bias would still result
from the fact that private claimants are driving the agenda.
The bias towards short-run effects and the conflation of injury to
competitors with injury to competition combine with particular force
in refusal to deal cases to forge a kinder, gentler model of competi-
tion. To be sure, antitrust law does not always make dominant firms
(or groups of firms with market power) deal with rivals. It merely says
that if they refuse to do so, they must furnish a valid business justifica-
tion for their decision. 19 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has is-
sued no guidelines as to the nature and scope of valid business
justifications, presumably because it cannot usefully summarize every
business strategy that could be considered valid. Indeed, the best bus-
iness reason for refusing to deal with rivals is that in a zero-sum game,
one competitor's loss is another's gain. Needless to say, that kind of
response is not what the Court seems to have in mind. Even a slight
modification of this position, to say, for example, that "we can make
more profit by not dealing with rivals," would probably not suffice
without additional spin. However, this spin is more often a product of
legal creativity than business rationale. Aspen Skiing,20 the canonical
reference for modern single-firm refusals to deal, vividly illustrates this
practice.
Part III discusses how the Court in Aspen Skiing erred in its ap-
proach to the defendant's refusal to deal. The Court mistakenly as-
sumed that rivalrous competition could be evaluated as reasonable or
unreasonable according to standards of business efficiency. In es-
sence, the Court required the defendant to demonstrate affirmatively
that its refusal to deal with a rival was efficient.21 In itself this might
seem unobjectionable; competition, after all, is supposed to be effi-
cient. However, it is one thing to hold that objective up as a general
norm, and quite another to devise a set of judicially enforceable stan-
dards. In this case, the "efficiency" question was a matter of determin-
ing whether the defendant's bargaining terms were reasonable or
unreasonable. The Court perceived the defendant's terms to be so
17 E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) ("The
antitrust laws... were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors.'" (emphasis
in original) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))); 1 PHIL
LIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST L,W 112, at 123-24 (rev. ed. 1997).
18 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), is a quintessen-
tial example. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 608.
20 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
21 See id. at 609-11.
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manifestly unreasonable as to constitute a refusal.22 Because that re-
fusal meant foregoing some short-term profits from cooperation, the
Court deemed this behavior anticompetiive.2 3 This analysis invites a
level of judicial scrutiny that seems inappropriate to the commercial
context of antitrust. More fundamentally, this approach perversely
prioritizes competitor cooperation over competitive rivalry.
I do not suggest there is never an occasion warranting forced deal-
ing between rivals. Following the redoubtable Captain Corcoran, I am
content with a "hardly ever" condition which is best confined to the
essential facilities doctrine. While this doctrine has been attacked by
antitrust scholars,24 their criticisms ring hollow when one considers
the much vaguer framework used to evaluate refusals to deal indepen-
dent of whether essential facilities are involved. The essential facilities
framework is an unalloyed improvement over the kind of "analysis"
that underlies scrutiny of refusals to deal in cases like Aspen Skiing.
And despite the common complaint that courts have stretched the
essential facilities doctrine too far, they have actually applied it with
restraint.25 Critics have perhaps been misled by the ease with which
the doctrine is invoked by frustrated competitors, and have ignored
the fact that the lower courts have generally (with notable exceptions)
understood its proper limits. Unfortunately, so long as liability for
refusals to deal can be predicated on amorphous standards of general
monopolization doctrine, understanding the limits of the essential fa-
cilities doctrine accomplishes little.
Understanding the limits of the essential facilities doctrine re-
quires an understanding of what the doctrine itself entails, to which
task Part IV is devoted. The numerous discussions of the doctrine in
the literature preclude the need for a detailed treatment of the case
law. The elements of essential facilities doctrine are mostly intuitive,
but they involve certain complexities that most commentators over-
look. For example, one intricacy concerns the element of "essential-
ity"-namely, whether the essential facilities doctrine implies a natural
monopoly with respect to the facilities in question, and if so, whether
it makes sense to promote competition through forced sharing of
these facilities. Another issue is the extent to which the feasibility of
dealing or sharing facilities should influence a court's decision to or-
der sharing of essential facilities. Some critics claim that the essential
facilities doctrine invites courts to act as regulators. Contending that
antitrust and regulation are like oil and water, these scholars suggest
22 See id.
23 Id. at 610-11.
24 See, e.g., Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
AxNrrmusr L.J. 841 (1989).
25 See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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that forced sharing of facilities is best left to regulators.26 This at-
tempt to draw a sharp demarcation between antitrust and regulatory
objectives is a mistake. Although in some situations a regulatory envi-
ronment may help to define the terms of forced dealing or sharing of
facilities, in general, if mandatory dealing is an inappropriate antitrust
objective, then it is an inappropriate objective for regulation as well.
Thus, the essential facilities doctrine provides the proper framework
for analyzing both regulatory and antitrust requirements for forced
dealing or sharing among rivals.
Two recent controversies over forced sharing of facilities illustrate
the nexus between antitrust and regulation. The first, involving access
provisions in local telecommunications services, is purely a matter of
regulatory policy. Access is mandated by statute, and the only open
questions concern implementation, including whether to apply the es-
sential facilities framework. The second controversy, which centers on
demands for sharing cable broadband facilities providing Internet ac-
cess, has provoked skirmishes on both antitrust and regulatory bat-
tlegrounds. In both controversies, it is a close question whether the
access requirement makes sense, but the bottom line is less important
than the methodology. Neither controversy has been modeled in
terms of a carefully limited essential facilities doctrine, and conse-
quently, the access question has been left to the untethered discretion
of regulators and the vagaries of regulatory politics.
I
THE LIABILIrY STANDARD FOR CoLLECrIvE AND
SINGLE-FIRM REFUSALS
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court discarded its ear-
lier assumption that collective boycotts are an unambiguous evil. 27 In
so doing, it essentially ratified lower court holdings in apparent defi-
26 See, e.g., Areeda, supra note 24.
27 The modern view that boycotts should be analyzed under a rule of reason stems
from Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
297-98 (1985). See also FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457-65 (1986) (evalu-
ating FTC findings under rule of reason analysis). The classic per se cases addressed many
types of refusal. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S.
656 (1961) (overturning the dismissal of a claim against members of an association that set
standards for gas burners for refusing to sell gas for use in unapproved burners); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (ruling on allegations that retailer, dis-
tributors, and manufacturers conspired to refuse to supply equipment to retailer's compet-
itor); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (considering bylaws that
prohibited members from disseminating news to nonmembers and granted members a
veto over admission of new members); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457 (1941) (condemning as illegal a group boycott of retailers who sold women's
clothing patterned on pirated designs).
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ance of the Court's per se regime.28 The Court's acceptance of a rule
of reason standard for concerted refusals seemed to eliminate the dis-
tinction between assumptions about the harms from collective refusals
to deal and single-firm refusals, which have always been analyzed
under a rule of reason. Unfortunately, the Court did not say the per se
rule never applies; it merely said the rule applies "hardly ever."29 Some
lower courts are not even certain that "hardly ever" is the correct
phrase, and have suggested that the rule of reason is still the excep-
tion to the per se baseline rule.30 This is an upside-down interpretation
of the Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,31 which treated the per se rule as the
28 See, e.g., Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 454 (2d Cir.) (holding
that courts should not apply the per se rule to cooperative activities of sports organizations),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351,
1369-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (declining to apply the per se rule but denouncing the challenged
criteria for admission to a multiple listing service under rule of reason analysis); Worthen
Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 126 (8th Cir. 1973) (declin-
ing to analyze a bylaw preventing membership in a credit card system under a per se rule),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
29 In NYNEX v. Discon, Inc. Corp., 525 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1998), the Court found per se
cases such as Kor's inapplicable in the context of vertical refusals to deal, but continued to
treat the per se cases as viable precedent for other unspecified situations. See also Diaz v.
Farley, 215 F.3d 1175, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to apply the per se rule to a
group refusal but noting that the Northwest Wholesale Stationers Court had merely "clarified"
Kior, not overruled it); LIAWRENCE A. SUL-rVAN & WARREN S. GRuMEs, THE LAW OF ANi-
TRUST 273 (2000) (stating that the Court has "limited the breadth of, but not backed away
from" the holding of K/or's).
30 See, e.g., Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1999) (acknowledging the
current confusion on the status of collective boycotts and then proceeding to demonstrate
its own confusion). After citing Kors, 359 U.S. at 212, for the proposition that
"[glenerally, group boycotts are illegal per se" the court proceeded to observe, citing North-
west Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298, that "[n]ot all such boycotts, however, are per se
violations." Bogan, 166 F.3d at 515. This articulation of the rule seems to characterize
Northwest Wholesale Stationers as a minor exception to the general principle of Kor, quite
contrary to the trend of outcomes following Northwest Wholesale Stationers. Additionally, in
Tacker v. Wilson, 830 F. Supp. 422 (W.D. Tenn. 1993), the court declared "the apparent
rule" to be that "concerted refusals to deal are violations per se of § 1 where there is no
plausible argument that the refusal to deal accentuates efficiency and where it is impossi-
ble to prove that the conspirators possess market power." Id. at 476. This articulation of
the rule suggests that defendants bear the burden of proving efficiency or lack of market
power as an affirmative defense. It is, admittedly, hard to know what to make of opinions
like these. In both Bogan and Tacker, courts declined to apply the per se rule, which ap-
proach has become the dominant trend since the mid-1980s. However, the absence of
clear thinking about the per se rule in concerted boycott cases, coupled with the absence of
any thinking about the underlying theory, is troublesome. Consider the Bogan court's ex-
planation for declining to apply the per se rule. The court refused to apply the "general
rule" because the boycott did not "fit the classic model[,] that is, a 'concerted attempt by a
group of competitors at one level to protect themselves from competition from non-group
members who seek to compete at that level.'" Bogan, 166 F.3d at 515 (citing Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). This so-called "classic model" of an
inherently illegal boycott is not a model of anything but confusion. Indeed, it is so vaguely
defined that it could be applied in almost any refusal to deal case.
31 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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exception to be applied only when the group possesses "market power
or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition." 32
However, fussing over which rule is the baseline and which is the
exception is itself a diversion. The real confusion lies in the notion
that a per se rule can be sensibly applied to refusal cases. Despite the
Court's casual statement that a company may incur per se liability in
market power/essential facility cases, such a literal interpretation
makes no sense. First, since the Court has continued to affirm the
dictum in United States v. Colgate & Co. that even monopolists may not
be required to deal with competitors,33 the mere existence of market
power is not a sufficient basis for imposing per se liability for refusing
to deal unless there is a special exception for collective refusals. Yet
there is no reason to distinguish a group wielding monopoly power
from a single-firm monopolist. Even though group action is techni-
cally governed by § 1 of the Sherman Act while single-firm conduct
falls under § 2 of the Sherman Act,3 4 that simply means that there
must be proof of agreement in the first case. That in itself should not
affect the basic standard for proving wrongful effect. The mere fact of
agreement among competitors is not a sufficient basis for per se liabil-
ity any more than the existence of market power. If neither agree-
ment nor market power standing alone is sufficient to trigger per se
liability, it is difficult to see how combining both changes the equa-
tion. An actionable agreement to monopolize between two firms
should require the same anticompetitive conduct as monopolization
itself.35 If the conduct element of the latter is not subject to the per se
rule, then it makes no sense to treat the former under per se analysis.
In both cases the reasonableness of the conduct is a critical determi-
nant of whether there has been an antitrust harm.3 6 Second, the ex-
32 Id. at 296.
33 See discussion supra note 1.
34 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999). Of course, group action could also fall
under § 2 if the criterion of market power is sufficient to meet the tests of monopolization
or conspiracy to monopolize.
35 I say "should" mindful of the fact that some courts have held that a "conspiracy to
monopolize" under § 2 does not require the same proof of monopoly power as the com-
pleted offense of monopolization. See, e.g., Alexander v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173,
1181 (8th Cir. 1982); Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 108 F. Supp. 2d 549,
588-90 (W.D. Va. 2000). Insofar as this approach suggests that a conspiracy to monopolize
is actionable under § 2 even though the parties lack the market power to succeed, it makes
no economic sense. It also seems inconsistent with the spirit, if not the precise holding, of
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 547 (1986), in which the
Court determined that a conspiracy to monopolize by means of predatory pricing is not
actionable in the absence of proof of a reasonable prospect of success. Id. at 596-97. In all
events, as applied to mere refusals to deal, Northwest Wholesale Stationers clearly holds that
the mere fact of an agreement is not a sufficient basis for imposing liability without proof
of market power. 472 U.S. at 298.
36 One could make a nonfrivolous argument for revising the antitrust laws to make
the mere existence of monopoly power a sufficient basis for antitrust intervention, as was
[Vol. 87:11771186
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ception for control of an essential facility also makes no sense of per se
liability. Applying the essential facility doctrine necessitates an inquiry
into such issues as essentiality and practicability of sharing, which are
the routine matters of rule of reason inquiry.3 7
Some commentators argue that collective activity should be scru-
tinized more closely than single-firm activity because it has a greater
potential for harm.38 As a general proposition this is dubious. Power
is power, whether exercised by one firm acting alone or four firms
acting in collusion. In the face of certain alleged offenses, such as
horizontal price fixing, singling out the element of concerted activity
is appropriate.3 9 However, refusals to deal bear little resemblance to
price fixing. If refusing to deal harms a competitor, then that harm is
not greater at the hands of a four-firn cartel with substantial market
power than from a single firm with equal market power. Consider a
group of four competitors who collectively account for eighty percent
of the market for gizmos. They form a joint venture for purchasing
certain inputs but refuse to admit any other gizmo manufacturer into
the joint venture. The joint venture might facilitate the development
of a cartel, both on the selling side as well as the buying side. Exclud-
ing other manufacturers might strengthen that cartel, on the princi-
ple that too many cartel members are like too many cooks in the
proposed many years ago by the "Neal Report." See REPORT OF THE WHrrE HOUSE TASK
FORCE ON ANTITRUST PoLIc [THE NEAL REPORT] (1968), reprinted in 1J. REPRINTs FOR ANTI-
TRusT L. & ECON. 631, 637-38 (1969). I rather doubt that would be a good idea, for the
reasons explored by Judge Richard Posner, supra note 3, at 78-95. However, the relevant
point for now is that in such a scheme it is the element of market power, not the element of
agreement, that is doing all the work.
37 Cf IIIA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, 773e, at 213-14 (stating that essen-
tial facilities doctrine "is not a 'per se' rule in any sense"). There is some confusion on this
point. For example, in Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986), the court
treated a group refusal to lease an essential facility (a stadium) as per se illegal because the
refusal was unaccompanied by a procompetitive justification. Id. at 541. Citing Northwest
WIwlesale Stationers, the court held that "group boycotts may properly be characterized as
perse illegal if the defendants have either 'market power' or 'exclusive access to an element
essential to effective competition.'" Id. (quoting Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at
296). The per se characterization is confusing because it apparently relies on the fact that
the defendants offered no justification for their refusal. However, a practice that is truly
per se illegal is one that is beyond justification, not simply one that the defendant has the
burden of justifying. The typical application of the essential facilities doctrine contem-
plates an inquiry into the element of practicability, which in effect functions as a rule of
reason.
38 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLIcY 194-96 (2d ed. 1999); see also
Data Gen. v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d 1147, 1183 (1st Cir. 1994) (distinguishing
unilateral and concerted refusals to deal, but failing to explain the reason for the
distinction).
39 Thus, unilateral price fixing would not be illegal, even if done by a monopolist.
While we might outlaw the accumulation of monopoly power, it would be silly to condemn
a firm for doing what a firm is supposed to do-namely, fixing its own prices. Glen 0.
Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method, 80 VA. L.
REv. 577, 597 (1994).
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kitchen. However, one cannot credibly claim that the joint venture
presents a greater threat on either the selling or buying side than a
single firm that controls eighty percent of the market. Indeed, our
experience with the inherent fragility of cartels40 tells us the contrary;
all else being equal, the monopolist is the more dangerous actor.41
Granted, collective refusals might be linked to activities that are
independently illegal per se, such as price fixing.42 But if the refusal to
deal is per se illegal only because it is a component of behavior that is
illegal on its own terms, then the refusal element is superfluous.43
While the refusal might provide probative evidence of the separately
unlawful activity, that should have no bearing on whether the refusal
itself is an element of the violation. Consider, for example, the Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. case.44 A group of appliance manufac-
turers agreed among themselves and with the Broadway-Hale depart-
ment store chain to boycott Klor's, a competitor of Broadway-Hale. 45
The boycott appears to have been an effort to enforce a resale price
maintenance scheme, though this is not discussed by the Court. If it
was a resale price maintenance scheme, then it almost certainly
benefitted the manufacturers as a group, rendering Klor's allegation
that they were forced into the boycott by Broadway-Hale's "monopolis-
40 See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 244-47 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing the susceptibility of cartels to chisel-
ing and ultimate breakdown). This is simply an instance of the central problem of all
collective action-how to maintain collective cohesion in the face of individual incentives
to cheat.
41 There might be a special reason for distinguishing the two situations when the
issue is whether to stop the formation of a joint venture. The merger or even partial
merger of firms producing a market share of 80% would be subject to challenge even
though the mere existence of a single firm with 80% market share would be immune from
antitrust liability. This result simply reflects the political economy of antitrust enforcement
policy: preventing monopoly concentration is less costly than breaking it up when it is
found to exist.
42 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 422-23 (1990) (ad-
dressing a boycott in support of lawyers' demand for greater compensation); see also Collins
v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 478 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852
(1988) (discussing exclusive contract for provision of pathology services).
43 Herbert Hovenkamp observes that even if the refusal to deal claim is not grounds
for a separate violation, a refusal to deal claim might grant certain plaintiffs access to the
courts. HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, at 218. Apparently the aim is to allow these plaintiffs to
challenge practices that they would have no independent standing to challenge. For in-
stance, a firm that is excluded from a price-fixing cartel presumably could not claim anti-
trust injury for the illegal price fixing. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (holding that rivals of a cartel cannot claim injury from
the cartel if they benefit from the cartel's activities). If the substantive offense does not
provide a basis for private standing, it seems odd to create a bogus violation simply to allow
a challenge that the standing rules would otherwise preclude. Although one might argue
that courts should liberalize the standing rules to facilitate private enforcement of antitrust
laws, there is no legitimate reason to relax standing requirements just for exclusion cases.
44 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
45 Id. at 209.
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tic" buying power implausible. Indeed, the group of appliance manu-
facturers included the leading firms in the industry, who were unlikely
to be held captive by a single department store chain. The Supreme
Court's recent interpretation of Klor' is that a horizontal restraint war-
ranted per se treatment, meaning presumably that the purpose of the
boycott was to enforce an upstream cartel among the manufacturers. 46
Whether or not this accurately reflects the Court's thinking in Klor's is
debatable, but the opinion itself gives no indication either way. Ac-
cepting the current interpretation simply confirms that the refusal
functions not as the offense, but merely as the evidence. In other
words, if the manufacturers were engaged in an upstream cartel and
used the boycott to enforce that cartel, the basis for per se illegality
would be the former and not the latter.47
As discussed previously, confusion over the nominal distinction
between collective and single-firm refusals is interesting primarily for
what it suggests about the incoherence of the refusal to deal doctrine.
The enduring legacy of Klor' reflects a larger confusion about anti-
trust methodology, specifically the roles of per se and rule of reason
analyses. 48 More immediately, it exposes uncertainty over the role
and purpose of refusals to deal as an antitrust offense. Absent some
theory for imposing the duty to deal, or some doctrinal principle that
defines its boundaries, the question whether collective refusals should
be treated differently from single-firm refusals is trivial.
II
COMPETING WImouT APOLOGY
In 1919, the Court in Colgate held that its earlier proscription of
resale price maintenance applied only to manufacturers who set
46 See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc. 525 U.S. 128, 134-36 (1998).
47 In this case, the upstream cartel would benefit from enforcing resale prices as a
means of discouraging price cutting among the cartel members, because if prices were
fixed at retail, a cartel cheater could not increase its market share. See Lester G. Telser,
Miy Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3J. L. & ECON. 86, 96-99 (1960).
48 The once bright line between per seviolations and offenses analyzed under a rule of
reason has become so blurred in modem antitrust cases that it seems unwise to rely on this
distinction to differentiate among the different refusal to deal cases. At one time there was
a hard and fast rule that persons may neverfix prices, but in 1979, the Court amended that
rule to hardly ever. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24
(1979) (establishing that price fixing incident to group licensing is not illegal per se);
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (holding that
price fixing in team sports is not illegal perse). In 1999 the price-fixing rule morphed again
into an "it all depends" standard with California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999),
when the Court reversed a lower court's "quick look" condemnation of an association's
ethical rules restricting price and nonprice advertising, and suggested a "sliding scale" of
relevant factors in evaluating the probable consequences of this kind of restraint. Id. at
779-80. The Court, it seems, is not enamored with per se rules about rules. See Stephen
Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look but Not the Full Monty, 67 AN'rusTT
LJ. 495, 520 (2000).
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prices through agreements with retailers that did not restrict unilat-
eral action by the manufacturers. 49 The Court explained its decision
with a broad declaration of principle: absent a purpose of creating or
maintaining a monopoly, merchants should be free to trade with
whomever they wish and on such conditions as they choose.50 Col-
gate's declaration remains the baseline norm and continues to be cited
in antitrust cases with programmed repetition. The norm itself re-
mains unexplained; it is just one of those original principles that is
grounded only on itself.
Another way of analyzing the Colgate norm is to view it in terms of
basic property rights principles. Economic liberty has always been as-
sociated with property rights, and vice versa.51 In modem functional-
ist jargon, the freedom to deal or not to deal with parties of one's
choosing would be associated with the right to exclude, which was de-
clared by the Supreme Court to be one of the most fundamental prop-
erty rights. 52 Conceptualizing Colgate's freedom formulation as a
property right may not enhance its legitimacy, but it does illuminate
the economic justification for exclusive property rights. This justifica-
tion ought to be particularly compatible with the antitrust laws, which
are supposedly grounded on the same ecomomic principle.
The economic justification for exclusive property rights is re-
hearsed in every introductory property course: exclusive property
rights allow resources to be used more efficiently. Forced dealing
translates into forced sharing of property.53 The sub-optimality of this
result can be expressed as a tragedy of the commons problem.54 Per-
haps it is a stretch to equate forced dealing with the commons prob-
49 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
50 Id.
51 See Glen 0. Robinson, Evolving Conceptions of 'Property' and 'Liberty' in Due Process
Jurisprudence, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT 63, 82-86 (Ellen Frankel Paul & How-
ard Dickman eds., 1989) (discussing the overlap of property and liberty concepts in the
context of economic rights).
52 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
53 Not dealing and not sharing have different connotations. A refusal to share con-
notes a refusal to allow access to certain property, such as a capital asset used as part of a
firm's production function. A refusal to deal, on the other hand, might further entail
refusing to sell end products. At bottom, however, both invoke the exercise of property
rights, and there is no reason to base legal distinctions on whether the refusal involves a
refusal to sell or lease an end product or a capital asset. The antitrust problem triggered
by the refusal to deal with rivals in either case invariably concerns a refusal to sell or lease a
good that is used as an input to the rival's end product.
54 For the classic source of the "tragedy" label, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE (n.s.) 1243 (1968). But see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986) (demonstrat-
ing that common property is not always tragic). Rose's qualification of the typical charac-
terization of the commons dilemma suggests that some types of social activities depend on
common access to places, such as beaches and parks. These uses, however, are not part of
the normal organization of commerce with which the antitrust laws are concerned.
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lem because the former always assumes a pricing mechanism that will
ration demand. However, the underlying issue is the same: forced
dealing or sharing of property discourages investment. Significantly,
the perverse incentives of forced sharing are two-fold. It is not simply
that such sharing undermines the investment incentive of the firm
that is forced to cooperate. It also erodes the incentives of firms con-
sidering investment in new, unproven technologies. Consider the
case of a firm contemplating competitive entry into a market where an
incumbent firm has established, but aging, facilities. A new company
might opt to invest in new facilities to gain a competitive advantage
through more efficient production. However, allocating scarce re-
sources to expensive and unproven assets puts more capital at risk
than the alternative strategy of attempting to access and exploit the
incumbent firm's facilities. This strategy may not be risk-proof, as
competitive entrants into local telecommunications markets can at-
test.55 However, the option to share the incumbent's assets undoubt-
edly skews the new entrant's investment incentives away from new
technologies.
This is all unexceptionable as a matter of basic principle, but in-
sofar as these principles derive from economic efficiency objectives
and not property rights themselves, one might question whether pre-
serving normal property rights is in fact the best way to achieve eco-
nomic efficiency in any particular case. It is not freedom to choose
"all the way down" but only down to the point where the freedom
conflicts with some other requirement of economic efficiency. But
what is that "other requirement of economic efficiency?" More impor-
tantly, who has the burden of establishing economic efficiency?
Surely it cannot be enough for a firm to assert that it would be desira-
ble for them to use their competitor's property and then shift the bur-
den to the competitor to prove that the suggested arrangement is not
efficient. Our concept of competition is based on a regime of exclu-
sive property rights, and it sounds trite to observe that exclusive rights
entail the possibility of excluding others.56 Competitors are supposed
to compete with their own property, not with the assets of their com-
petitors-witness the common law doctrine of "unfair competition,"
which prohibits firms from helping themselves to a competitor's prop-
55 See infra Part IV.C.I. Competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) that counted on
developing an advantage over incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) by selectively
leasing incumbent facilities are now questioning whether this is a viable long-term strategy.
The CLECs complain that the ILECs will not provide access on terms that permit them a
profit and that the FCC is not enforcing fair and reasonable terms. See Rebecca Blumen-
stein, Reform Act Hasn't Delivered Promises to Customers, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2001, at B1;
Carolyn Hirschman, A Question of Strategy: CLECs Look for the Best Way to Break ILEC Monopo-
lies, TELEPHONY, Feb. 19, 2001, at 86.
56 See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176 (asserting that the right to exclude is "one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property").
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erty.57 When a Wal-Mart comes to town, it is a safe bet that many
smaller retailers that sell similar merchandise will suffer. Those who
think that small retailing serves a vital community function may la-
ment this new competition, but sensible people are unlikely to pro-
pose the remedy of forcing Wal-Mart to provide floor space to its
smaller competitors so that they may enjoy the benefits of Wal-Mart's
magnetic pull on consumers. Turning Wal-Mart into a wholesaler of
retail space might not forge a rift in the moral fabric of society, but it
would be a counterproductive strategy if competition is what we are
seeking.
Significantly, forced sharing promotes competition only when
two exceptional circumstances exist. First, the situation must be one
in which forced sharing is a necessary condition of competition.58
Second, the circumstances must be such that competition under a re-
gime of forced cooperation would be efficient.59 Without such a
showing, a firm can free-ride on another company's investments in
infrastructure by demanding access to those assets on more favorable
terms than it could realize by supplying the assets itself.
I use the phrase "free-ride" advisedly. Whether there is a free-
ride on the competitor's investment depends on the extent to which
the competitor is compensated for the use of its assets. On some
terms there would be no free-ride, but there would also be no contro-
versy. Insofar as forced sharing involves a compromise of exclusive
property rights, it is equivalent to a private power of eminent domain.
In both the eminent domain and forced sharing contexts there will
always be a voluntary exchange if the property seeker is willing to pay
the reservation price of the property owner. In both situations, the
controversy over forced acquisition/sharing arises only because the in-
itial offer is less than the reservation price. So in both cases, given the
57 See, e.g., Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (1918) (ruling that
the act of copying news from a competitor's bulletin board constitutes unfair competition).
Intellectual property law limits the scope of the misappropriation tort because of possible
preemption by federal copyright or patent law. See, e.g., Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors
Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that state law of misappropriation of
financial information was preempted by copyright law if the state law provided protection
that was "equivalent" to that of the copyright law). However, the possibility of federal pre-
emption does not alter the basic proposition that the unauthorized use of a competitor's
property is generally considered an unacceptable form of competition.
58 This, of course, is the point of the essential facilities doctrine, examined below,
infra Part IV.B.
59 The latter showing might appear superfluous since it is the underlying assumption
of the antitrust laws. However, as discussed subsequently, the assumption that the shared
use of a facility is a prerequisite to competition implies the existence of a natural monopoly
with respect to that facility. According to conventional wisdom, competition in a naturally
monopolistic market is not efficient. That conventional wisdom is incomplete insofar as it
ignores dynamic industry conditions and evolutions in relevant technology that might al-
low the market to become competitive over time. Rather than blindly following conven-
tional wisdom, courts should consider these issues and not dismiss them out of hand.
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absence of voluntary exchange, it is necessary to calculate reasonable
terms for the coerced transaction. In the standard eminent domain
case, the formula is straightforward; the terms of the transaction are
simply price-related, and the "fair" price is always an estimate of objec-
tive market value.60 In the antitrust context, establishing fair terms for
forced sharing is not as trivial. For one thing, the question of fair
compensation is complicated by the absence of a market for the assets
to be shared. For example, there is no established market for another
firm's established business methods, or for unique assets such as intel-
lectual property.
More importantly, fairly compensating a competitor for forced
sharing incorporates considerations not usually encountered in the
conventional eminent domain context. If the highway department
takes my house, for example, the fair market value that I receive in
exchange will not include the personal or subjective value I have "in-
vested" in the house. 61 I could reasonably object to the unfairness of
being forced to sacrifice personal value for the sake of the general
public welfare, but I could not accuse the government of "free-riding"
on my investment. To be sure, undervaluing my house might errone-
ously induce the government to bypass a voluntary exchange in favor
of a coercive transfer. However, at least the government is not adding
insult to injury by using my house to cause me further loss in the mar-
ketplace. When a firm is granted access to another firm's assets, how-
ever, this is precisely what happens if the intruding firm does not
compensate its competitor for risks undertaken at the time of the in-
vestment. When, for example, Firm A invests in assets (both tangible
and intangible), there is a risk that its costs of investment will be
"stranded" if the market will not yield a payoff sufficient for the firm
to recoup its investment. 62 While this risk is continuous in a dynamic
market, it is most acute in the start-up years. Now, after Firm A is
successfully established, Firm B seeks to share its assets. At what price
will Firm A be fully compensated and Firm B prevented from free-
riding? To avoid free-riding it would seem that Firm B should not get
the assets at any price less than their value in the hands of Firm A, which
is to say, the opportunity cost to Firm A of losing exclusive use of the
60 The assumption here, of course, is that the asking price of the owner is higher than
the objective market price as a consequence of opportunistic holding out or subjective
valuation.
61 See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) ("Because
of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth of individual places on particular
property at a given time, we have recognized the need for a relatively objective working
rule.").
62 While "stranded costs" are associated with "sunk costs," sunk costs are stranded only
to the extent that the assets cannot be redeployed or sold.
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assets. Only in this way can Firm A be compensated for the risk in-
curred in making the initial investment.63
While at first glance the opportunity cost valuation in this exam-
ple appears to approximate the subjective value in my homeowner ex-
ample, upon closer examination the two are quite different. By
assumption, subjective value has no reliably objective measure, which
is the conventional justification for excluding it from eminent domain
compensation. 64 For business assets, however, the opportunity cost is
easily measured in terms of the revenue lost by the owner as a conse-
quence of not being able to use the asset exclusively. 65 A duty to deal
with others in the abstract is meaningless until one specifies the terms
on which such dealing must take place. Before a court directs that
Firm A or a group of firms including Firm A66 deal with Firm B, it
should determine a reasonable level of compensation. Unfortunately,
this step is often overlooked by courts ordering firms to deal with their
competitors, as illustrated by Aspen Skiing,67 the leading modem deci-
sion on refusals to deal.
III
LET'S (NOT) MAKE A DRAT
In Aspen Skiing, defendant Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co.) con-
trolled access to three of the four downhill skiing mountains in Aspen,
Colorado. Ski Co. refused to renew a contractual arrangement with a
competitor, Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Highlands), which owned
the fourth downhill skiing mountain in town. Under that arrange-
ment, Ski Co. and Highlands had offered skiers a six-day, four-moun-
tain ski ticket that allowed skiers access to all the mountains in Aspen
at a discount from the daily rate. The two firms split revenues from
the sale of six-day tickets based on area usage. After fifteen years of
this arrangement, Ski Co. demanded that Highlands accept a share of
the revenues that was below its historical average based on usage.
63 Commentators have explored the theoretical argument for an opportunity cost
standard at length in the context of pricing inputs sold to competitors. See, e.g., WilliamJ.
Baumol &J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALJ. ON REG. 171,
199-201 (1994);J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: Gov-
ernment Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 1081, 1095-98 (1997). However, the opportunity cost standard can be
controversial. See infra note 192.
64 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511.
65 The example generalizes from a conflict over pricing of access by CLECs to net-
work elements owned by ILECs. For further discussion, see infra notes 188-93 and accom-
panying text.
66 The discussion assumes a single firm for expositional convenience. However, all
else being equal, the following arguments are as applicable to refusals by a collection of
firms as to refusals by a single firm.
67 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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Highlands refused and suffered a loss of patronage because it was una-
ble to offer skiers the convenience of discounted access to all four
mountains. 68 Ski Co. offered several business justifications in defense
of its refusal to deal, all of which the Supreme Court found wanting.
The Court found Ski Co. guilty of monopolization for having failed to
offer any efficiency justification for its conduct.69
Although the lower court's finding of monopoly power was con-
testable, Ski Co. did not in fact contest it before the Supreme Court.
The sole question before the Court was whether Ski Co.'s refusal to
deal with Highlands satisfied the conduct element of the monopoliza-
tion offense. Predictably, the Court's decision began by affirming the
time-worn principle that even monopolists do not have a general obli-
gation to deal with competitors.70 The opinion then proceeded to
undermine that principle by holding that a monopolist has the bur-
den of justifying a refusal to deal. 71 Instead of providing convincing
business justifications for its refusal to deal, Ski Co. offered a smoke
screen of explanations that the Court easily blew away. Apparently
relying on the epistemological principle that where there is smoke
there must have been fire, the Court found Ski Co.'s conduct suffi-
ciently offensive to satisfy the bad conduct element of § 2.72
The Court's opinion reversed the normal burden of proof. In-
stead of compelling the plaintiff to show that the defendant's refusal
to deal undermined competition, the Court required the defendant
to demonstrate that any harm to competition was justified by legiti-
mate business purposes.73 The burden shift in this case was crucial.
Highland would have been hard-pressed to demonstrate harm to com-
petition (as opposed to harm to a competitor). After all, forcing the
68 Id. at 589-95.
69 Id. at 610-11.
70 Id. at 595-600.
71 Id. at 608.
72 Id. at 608-10.
73 See id. at 605-11. It has been argued that showing specific harm to the competitive
marketplace is not one of the "black letter elements of the monopolization offense."
Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEo.
MASON L. REv. 495, 507 (1999). While this is technically correct, the conduct element of
monopolization implicitly requires some likelihood of ultimate harm to competition, as
distinguished from harm to a particular competitor. This is the central premise of Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Indeed, in rejecting a
monopolization claim based on refusal to deal, the First Circuit observed: "We label as
improper that conduct which harms the competitive process and not conduct which simply
harms competitors. That process is harmed when conduct 'obstructs the achievement of
competition's basic goals-lower prices, better products, and more efficient production
methods.'" Data Gen. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1182 (1st Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co.,
915 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1990)). By holding that firms with market power have a pre-
sumptive duty to deal with competitors, the Court in Aspen Skiing effectively circumvented
this larger principle of showing harm to "competition's basic goals."
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only two firms in a market to form a cooperative partnership does not
create competition; it merely creates a shared monopoly.74
Aspen Skiing offered no guidance on which justifications for refus-
ing to deal might be legitimate. This vague approach comports with
the indeterminacy of the rule of reason generally, except that here
the cost of that indeterminacy falls squarely on the defendant because
of the reversed burden of proof. This burden shift is not itself objec-
tionable, provided there is some prima facie basis for liability based on
the specific conduct. However, given that refusals to deal are not pre-
sumptively wrongful (the premise of the no-duty baseline rule), there
is no basis for presumptive liability based on the conduct of Aspen
Skiing. Furthermore, the only circumstance that appears relevant is
Ski Co.'s substantial market power. Thus, the lesson of Aspen Skiing is
that a firm with market power must justify its conduct by providing a
legitimate business reason for refusing to deal.
What constitutes a legitimate business reason?75 The explana-
tions offered by Ski Co. were transparent and unconvincing based on
the facts of the case. However, forensic deficiency is a flimsy basis for
antitrust liability in the absence of some clear principle justifying a
presumption of wrongdoing. 76 Suppose the defendant had simply
said: "Faced with the terms that plaintiff was demanding, we con-
cluded we could make more money without a deal." The Court would
undoubtedly have demanded a more detailed response, but what kind
of detail would be required? Must the defendant produce spread-
sheets, backed by economists and accountants, to prove that its profits
would be eroded by cooperative action?77
74 The Court noted that the Colorado Attorney General had filed a complaint alleg-
ing that the previous joint arrangements facilitated price fixing as well as attempted mo-
nopolization, a dispute the parties settled by consent decree. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 591
n.9. Apparently, it never occurred to the Court that the cooperative arrangement forced
by its decision amounted to no more than a sharing of the monopoly between the parties.
In the end, neither the antitrust suit nor the forced partnering with Ski Co. produced a
viable competitor. Highlands continued to lose money and finally merged with Ski Co. in
1993. Ski Merger May Perk Up Aspen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at 37.
75 See Patrick J. Ahem, Refusals to Deal After Aspen, 63 ANcrrrRusT L.J. 153, 172-82
(1994) (examining proposed business justifications that lower courts have accepted and
rejected after Aspen Skiing). Ahern's cases are not limited to those involving competitors
but include, for example, exclusive distribution arrangements. Reviewing the array of busi-
ness justifications that lower courts have sustained and rejected confirms the ad hoc nature
of this requirement.
76 See Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionay Conduct 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 972, 975-76 (1986). Easterbrook observes that businessmen find it difficult to articu-
late their strategies, either because they are unsure as to why something works, or because
they have not mastered the appropriate legal and economic jargon. Id. However, the de-
fectiveness of Ski Co.'s proffered justifications was most likely attributable to its lawyers
rather than its executives.
77 Even profit maximization might not be sufficientjustification, according to at least
one lower court. See Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d
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One approach might be to apply a standard predation test-the
refusing firm must demonstrate that its profitability is not dependent
on driving its rival from the market.78 However, this test is easier to
state than to apply. Even in predation cases when the court can con-
sult objective indicators of profitability, such as whether prices are
above or below "an appropriate measure" of cost,79 there is no consen-
sus on how the test should operate.80 Applying the test to all corpo-
rate conduct, including the refusal to enter into or continue deals
with rivals, is an adventure in second-guessing. Exactly how would one
show that a firm's maximizing strategy is premised on harm to a rival?
The activities of firms are not modeled by equations for profit max-
imization in which all the variables are neatly specified. Judicial scru-
tiny of business judgments is not inappropriate when the investigation
is guided by objective standards for "honestly industrial" conduct, to
borrow Learned Hand's phrase.8' However, such inquiries are tricky.
A monopolist may not set out to deliberately "exclude" rivals, but
surely a firm can contemplate the exclusion of a rival as a secondary
consequence of its own profit-maximizing strategy-that is what com-
petition is all about. Under the rivalrous competition model, the firm
that does not consider, and seek, its rivals' disappearance from the
market should contemplate its own disappearance from the market.
How one demonstrates reasonable profit maximization is beside
the point in the absence of any clear indication that this is a proper
criterion. Aspen Skiing did not apply such a test. The Court was skepti-
cal of Ski Co.'s rejection of a chance to earn additional revenues from
Cir. 1990) ("The fact that profit maximization is a goal of the [defendant's] policy.., does
not shield the policy from judicial scrutiny."). This statement makes no economic sense,
unless it is interpreted to mean that the profit maximization calculus must be made with-
out considering its impact on the rival.
78 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE AI'mrrusT PARADox 144 (1978) (defining predation
as the implementation of strategies that are not profit maximizing except on the expecta-
tion that they will drive a rival from the market or induce the firm to abandon competitive
behavior). Judge Bork affirmed his own test in Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d
424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic
Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE LJ. 8, 9-10 (1981) (noting
that firms exhibit predatory behavior when the losses resulting from pricing below cost can
only be recouped by exercising the monopoly power that will accrue if a rival is driven
from the market).
79 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222
(1993).
80 The wide-scale acceptance of the Areeda-Turner average variable cost test of preda-
tion by lower courts has not resolved the controversy over the "appropriate" level of cost.
The Supreme Court has yet to affirm the test, and lower courts differ over its application.
For their part, antitrust scholars continue to debate its appropriateness and reliability, and
many have added their own refinements. For recent reviews of the judicial status of the
test and its various embellishments by courts and commentators, see Patrick Bolton et al.,
Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. LJ. 2239, 2250-55 (2000), and
also HOvENKAMP, supra note 38, at 337-60.
81 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
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the joint venture,8 2 but it did not formulate any general test ofjustifia-
ble profit maximization from this observation, nor could it have done
so without further examination of the business alternatives. Suppose
Ski Co. calculated that its ability to offer a package for three of the
four slopes would allow it to capture most of the market on its own.83
A sensible, noncooperative business strategy might be to exclusively
allocate resources to developing the three-slope package, rather than
to compete with itself by offering both a three-slope and a four-slope
(or perhaps only a four-slope) package. The assumption is that in the
long run, Ski Co. would profit more from capturing the total gains of
a three-slope package than it would from receiving a share of the four-
slope package. This is particularly the case when the sharing formula
does not compensate Ski Co. for attracting skiers to Aspen, allowing
Highland to free-ride on Ski Co.'s investments.8 4
Whether the defendant is willing to forego some short-run profits
cannot be the applicable test in these cases. Such an approach would
put at risk the strategy of every dominant firm that faces market ri-
valry. Of course, any firm's long-run strategy implies hurting the com-
petition. This is a classic illustration of the zero-sum character of
rivalrous competition. If a defendant's noncooperative strategy is suc-
cessful, its revenue gains are likely to come at the plaintiff's expense.8 5
To carry it one step further, suppose a defendant knows that its non-
cooperative strategy will inevitably chase plaintiff from the market.
The mere contemplation of plaintiffs demise should not make the
defendant's conduct anticompetitive unless we formulate a rule that a
competitor may not pursue any competitive strategy with the intended
82 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 610-11 (concluding that Ski Co. "was willing to sacrifice
short-run benefits and consumer goodwill").
83 In fact, Ski Co.'s president made just such a calculation. See id. at 592.
84 See Easterbrook, supra note 76, at 976 (suggesting that Ski Co.'s insistence upon a
share higher than historic usage might have been justified as compensation for attracting
more skiers). My colleague, Ed Kitch, provides anecdotal corroboration from personal
recollections of skiing in Aspen that Highlands had not invested in upgrading its facilities
in a manner that would encourage more skiers to visit Aspen. Indeed, a former operator
of Highlands stated pointedly in 1993 that "'Highlands is the only operating ski lift mu-
seum in the world.' Ski Merger May Perk Up Aspen, supra note 74, at 37 (quoting RickJones,
Highlands operator for six years).
85 To the extent that the defendant's strategy increases overall market demand-in
this case, attracting more skiers to Aspen-the plaintiff may gain some spillover benefits.
However, to the extent that the defendant attempts to enhance the distinctive benefit of its
own product, the spillover gains accruing to the plaintiff are unlikely to offset the loss from
being foreclosed from the cooperative venture with defendant. The very fact of the defen-
dant's grievance in Aspen Skiing indicates that Highlands was dependent on spillover bene-
fits from Ski Co., and suggests that Highlands was free-riding on Ski Co.'s investments.
Thus, a sharing formula based only on usage would not fully compensate the defendant for
its investments to increase the overall demand for skiing in Aspen.
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or expected effect of destroying a competitor. One need not embrace
Schumpeter's model of competition to reject such a rule.8 6
Perhaps more important than the vagueness of profit-maximizing
strategies in these cases is the vagueness of reasonable bargaining
standards. Consider the circumstances of Aspen Skiing. For many
years the parties had a joint arrangement to share revenues based on
respective usage of the defendant's and plaintiff's ski slopes. Ski Co.
terminated the arrangement when Highland refused to accept the
percentage revenue offered because it was below the historical aver-
age based on use.8 7 Perhaps trapped by the respective use formula,
Ski Co. never offered a potentially plausible business justification
predicated on bargaining power rather than use.
From a bargaining perspective, Ski Co. controlled three of the
four slopes, and thus captured most of the gains from the multi-slope
ticket package. Promoting a four-slope ticket meant competing with
its own three-slope ticket. At some sharing percentage the former
might have been profit maximizing (it would yield some unique reve-
nues for defendant), but at another it would merely entail sharing
some of its monopoly rents with the plaintiff88 Ski Co.'s offer of a
12.5% share represented the defendant's marginal gain from cooper-
ating with the plaintiff rather than striking ahead on its own with a
three-mountain pass.89 While a four-mountain pass may have been
more attractive to skiers than a three-mountain pass, the sole concern
for Ski Co. was how much unique revenue the four-mountain pass
would produce that could not be captured over the long-run with only
a three-mountain pass. Put somewhat differently, Ski Co.'s reservation
price did not reflect the usage ratio between its slopes and Highland's
slopes (as the Court apparently assumed), but instead reflected the
comparative values of cooperation and noncooperation. 90
Of course, Ski Co.'s bargaining power, or "threat value" (the
value of its contribution to the bargaining surplus and the concomi-
tant cost to Highland of refusing to reach a deal) derives from its
86 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
87 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589-93.
88 There is no reason to assume that the sharing arrangement would produce more
competitive ski prices. In fact, competition was removed from the commercial activities
encompassed by the joint venture.
89 The assertion here is similar to the free-riding argument suggested earlier, but not
identical, because the value of Ski Co.'s contribution does not depend on any tangible
efficiencies contributed by the defendant. The measure of this value is not what the defen-
dant brings to the marke4 but what it brings to the bargaining tabl& Put plainly, the deal is
worth much less to Ski Co. than it is to Highlands.
90 I am indebted to my colleague Charles Goetz for illuminating conversations about
this aspect of Aspen Skiing. The basic idea is now incorporated in CHARLsJ. GoErz & FRED
S. MCCHsNEY, ANsrrrRusr Lw 23-24 (1998).
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dominant market position.9 1 One might contend that dominant firms
should not exploit their market power in establishing terms for deal-
ing with competitors. However, this argument presupposes an ability
to specify proper bargaining parameters based on idealized economic
conditions in a fully competitive market. In the context of regulated
firms, such as local telephone companies, this bargaining model is
currently used to justify ordering monopolies to provide access to
their facilities. 92 Even in this context, where access is driven by special
policy considerations, the controversy surrounding the bargaining
model suggests the impracticability of expecting courts to enforce
such a rule.
Although the Aspen Skiing Court failed to articulate a substantive
basis for its rule of presumptive liability, the circuit court below had
asserted that the refusal to deal was presumptively unlawful because
the ski slopes controlled by the defendant were an essential facility.9 3
The Supreme Court, perhaps unwilling to limit the scope of inquiry
under the Sherman Act, declined to apply the essential facilities doc-
trine.9 4 The Court's refusal to apply the essential facilities doctrine
might be defended on the ground that the ski slopes were not an
essential facility. That characterization would explain the Court's re-
fusal to apply the doctrine but not its preference for an undefined
standard of conduct under the general monopolization offense.
The essential facilities doctrine has a somewhat uncertain status
in antitrust law. While the doctrine does not have the official impri-
matur of the Supreme Court, the Court's opinions acknowledge the
doctrine as a product of its own prior decisions as well as those of the
lower courts.95 Critics of the essential facilities doctrine have com-
91 This is at least a fair assumption on the facts of the case. However, bargaining
power may also be a function of informational advantages that are independent of market
power. SeeJason ScottJohnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the
Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REv. 385, 425-26 (1999).
92 This is the theory underlying the FCC's so-called forward-looking, long-run incre-
mental pricing model which is used to calculate the rates at which competitive local ex-
change carriers are granted access to incumbent carriers' network facilities.
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,515 (1996) [hereinafter Implementation of the Local Compe-
tition Provisions], affJd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d
753 (8th Cir. 1997), affid in part and rev'd and remanded in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), affd in part and vacated in part on remand sub nom. Iowa Utils.
Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications
Inc. v. FCC, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001).
93 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th
Cir. 1984), afid, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
94 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.
95 In Iowa Utilities Board, Justice Scalia for the Court both acknowledged and seems to
have embraced essential facilities doctrine as a possible standard for interpreting a con-
gressionally mandated telecommunications access requirement. See 525 U.S. at 388; see also
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296
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plained that the doctrine is vague, unconfined, and threatens too
large an inroad on the basic no-duty-to-deal principle. 96
It is hard to know what to make of this lament. In a world where
antitrust violations can be conjured from an infinite range of behav-
ior, an ill-fitting essential facilities doctrine is merely a subset of a
more general phenomenon. When the fashion dujouris baggy attire,
complaints about a particular ill-fitting suit ring hollow. One leading
critic, Herbert Hovenkamp, complains that:
The. . . "essential facility" doctrine is one of the most troublesome,
incoherent and unmanageable of bases for Sherman § 2 liability.
The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if it
were jettisoned, with a little fine tuning of the general doctrine of
the monopolist's refusal to deal to fill in the resulting gaps.97
This is a very odd criticism. However "troublesome, incoherent and
unmanageable" the essential facilities doctrine may be, it is a model of
coherence and restraint compared to the unguided "general doc-
trine" of refusal to deal.98 Hovenkamp's critique suggests that the
duty to deal must be narrowly circumscribed. But this should not be
done by rejecting the essential facilities doctrine in deference to "the
general doctrine of the monopolist's refusal to deal." There is no
such "general doctrine" if by that is meant some well-defined rule or
standard of conduct. Aspen Skiing proved that much. The conven-
tional formulation of the monopolization offense is the possession of
monopoly power and "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."99 Anti-
trust law provides working definitions of monopoly power, but if God
knows the meaning of the second element He has not told the Su-
preme Court. The only certainty is that given the breadth and vague-
ness of the conduct standard in Aspen Skiing, the question of whether
Ski Co.'s three mountains constituted an "essential facility" becomes
insignificant.
Was the refusal to deal in Aspen Skiing a "willful acquisition or
maintenance" of monopoly power? The Court's affirmative answer re-
(1985) (noting that concerted refusals to deal may be illegal when the group controls "an
element essential to effective competition").
96 Virtually all critiques begin with Areeda, supra note 24. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wisc. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner,
J.); HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, at 305-11; Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. &J. Gregory Sidak, Essential
Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999).
97 HOVENKAIP, supra note 38, at 305.
98 Similarly puzzling is Areeda's characterization of the essential facilities doctrine as
an "epithet in need of limiting principles." Areeda, supra note 24, at 841. The importance
of limiting essential facilities doctrine pales in comparison to the need for limiting the
nebulous refusal to deal "doctrine" endorsed in Aspen Skiing.
99 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
2002] 1201
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
lied heavily on LorainJournalOO where the Court found a monopoly
newspaper liable for attempted monopolization for refusing to sell ad-
vertising to patrons of a local radio station that competed with the
paper. Because the defendant was accused of committing an attempt
offense, the Court in LorainJournal was required to find a specific in-
tent to accomplish an illegal act.101 Significantly, the Court required
no similar finding of intent in Aspen Skiing, noting that intent was only
"relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly
characterized as 'exclusionary' or 'anticompetitive."' 102 "Exclusion-
ary" conduct has become the conventional translation of "willful ac-
quisition or maintenance. 103  Under Learned Hand's famous
formulation in Alcoa, a monopolist may plead as a defense that its con-
duct is "honestly industrial.'10 4 Because the monopolist's state of
mind invariably will be inferred from the conduct, the difficult ques-
tion under Hand's test is what kind of conduct qualifies as "honestly
industrial"? Relying on Lorain Journal for this assessment seems mis-
placed; the case involved a boycott of third "persons who were not par-
ties to the competitive rivalry, and there was no question of forcing a
firm to share its facilities with a rival.105 Nor was it problematic to
compel the newspaper to justify its profit strategies, because it had no
logical reason for refusing to deal with the advertisers except to drive
its competitor out of business.' 06 It is difficult to fit Aspen Skiing into
that category; even assuming that Ski Co. was not engaged in short-
run profit maximization, it was not refusing to engage in its normal
business of selling ski services.
The Aspen Court emphasized that the defendant did not simply
reject an offer to enter into a joint venture but made "an important
change in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competi-
tive market and had persisted for several years.'u0 7 Some commenta-
tors suggest that the Court's holding on the duty to deal should be
limited to substantial alterations of past dealings, distinguishing this
circumstance from initial refusals to deal. 10 8 This gloss on Aspen Skiing
represents no principle other than limiting a poorly reasoned deci-
sion.10 9 Businesses constantly adapt their practices and partners. In-
100 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
101 See id. at 153.
102 472 U.S. at 602.
103 HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, at 274-75.
104 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
105 LorainJourna4 342 U.S. at 147-49.
106 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 29, at 133.
107 472 U.S. at 603.
108 HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, at 295.
109 One plausible basis for distinguishing termination cases from initial refusals is that
termination cases provide some basis for evaluating the reasonableness of proposed terms
of dealing. Cf Florida Fuels, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 717 F. Supp. 1528, 1536 (S.D. Fla.
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deed, this is the expected norm for competitors and monopolists
alike. Surely the rule cannot be that every time a firm with market
power alters its business method to the detriment of a competitor, the
firm must justify any shifts in approach to the court. Not only would
such a rule remove the conduct element from § 2, it would also im-
pose the same adverse effects on investment incentives as requiring
firms to share their assets in the first instance.
These observations concerning the vagueness of obligations to
deal with competitors might suggest that attempting to clarify the role
of essential facilities doctrine would have little use. After all, what is
the point of determining whether ownership of three out of four ski
slopes constitutes control over an essential facility if the Court invokes
an independent basis for requiring Ski Co. to share its three slopes
with Highland? On the one hand, so long as courts apply an "it-all-
depends" rule of reason to refusals to deal, an essential facilities analy-
sis is superfluous. On the other hand, if one takes seriously the decla-
ration that introduced this Article, academics and practitioners ought
to be searching for ways to define and limit the obligation to deal with
competitors. Ultimately, the best way to accomplish this is to use a
narrowly defined essential facilities doctrine as the sole foundation for
imposing such a duty.
This argument is not as radical as it might appear. It does not
imply that refusals to deal play no role outside the realm of essential
facilities. Refusals to deal might be one element of a course of con-
duct that violates antitrust law on independent grounds. For exam-
ple, while a group of competitors might refuse to deal with outsiders
in order to enforce a price-fixing cartel, the refusal itself would not be
actionable independent of the price-fixing offense."l 0 Similarly, a sin-
gle firm's refusal to deal might be evidence of monopolization."'
1989) (remarking, in the context of an essential facilities argument, that the absence of
any history of dealing complicates "the court's ability to enforce a duty to deal"). However,
given the dynamic nature of industry conditions and hence business responses, a history of
dealing is a weak predicate for imposing the duty.
110 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 296-98 (1985) (stating that not all collective refusals to deal are per se illegal). A
refusal to deal might confirm cartel behavior in several ways. Most obviously, a group
refusal to deal with a particular firm might indicate enforcement against a cheating cartel
member. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87
COLUM. L. Rxv. 295, 310-11 (1987) (discussing product exchanges among firms). Second,
a collective refusal to deal could represent a conscious effort to keep the group small to
facilitate cartel activity. One must be very cautious about either of these inferences in the
absence of other evidence of cartel activity, however, lest we return to the old Kors rule of
treating the refusal itself as forbidden conduct. See supra note 30.
111 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), affid in part
and rev'd in part, 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998), might be
distinguishable on this ground even though it is typically bracketed with Aspen Skiing for
the proposition that monopolists bear an affirmative burden ofjustifying refusals to deal
with competitors. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 73. In Kodak, the monopolization conduct was
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However, the refusal alone would not constitute a separate offense,
except in the rare case in which the monopolist controls an essential
facility.
IV
SHARING NECESSITIES
A. Evolution
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's refusal to embrace an es-
sential facilities doctrine, its decision in Terminal Railroad'12 is univer-
sally understood to be the seminal case in the evolution of the
essential facilities doctrine. In Terminal Railroad, a corporation com-
posed of a number of railroad companies controlled a rail terminal
and bridge facilities in St. Louis. The railroad formed the corporation
for the purpose of acquiring and consolidating the operation of termi-
nal facilities and rail connections to St. Louis and destinations be-
yond. Originally three independent terminal and rail access facilities
served St. Louis, providing competitive alternatives to some twenty-
four railroads that had lines into the city. Six railroads initially
founded the corporation but later expanded the association's mem-
bership to fourteen. Only railroads with a proprietary interest in the
corporation could use the facilities unless an outside party received
the unanimous consent of the member railroads.' 1 3 The Court found
that this arrangement violated the Sherman Act, emphasizing the po-
tential for exclusion or discrimination among rail carriers providing
service to St. Louis.1 4 The Court opined that the consolidation of
competing terminal facilities would not violate the antitrust laws pro-
vided that the facilities were managed so as to provide equal access to
all rail lines: "Plainly the combination which has occurred would not
be an illegal restraint under the terms of the statute if it were what is
claimed for it, a proper terminal association acting as the impartial
agent of every line which is under compulsion to use its instrumentali-
not only Kodak's refusal to sell parts to competitors (in the aftermarket for Kodak equip-
ment repair services), but also its agreement with its own upstream suppliers of original
equipment not to provide parts to the repair service competitors. 504 U.S. at 458. The
combination of the two refusals might be treated as exclusionary conduct similar to the
conduct challenged in LorainJournal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). On this view,
the proper remedy would be simply to remove the agreement with the original equipment
suppliers, not to force Kodak to deal with its competitors. Unfortunately, this combination
theory did not prevail on remand, and Kodak was forced to sell Kodak equipment parts to
competitive service organizations. Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1225.
112 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
113 Id. at 391-400.
114 Id. at 405-06. However, the Court implied that no outside railroad had actually
been denied use. Id. at 401 ("That the proprietary companies have not availed themselves
of the full measure of their power to impede free competition of outside companies may
be true.").
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ties."'1 5 From this it followed, the Court thought, that a sufficient
remedy would be to make the facilities owners the "bonafide agent and
servant of every railroad line which shall use its facilities." 1 6
In retrospect, it is easy to see how Terminal Railroad could be con-
strued as establishing a doctrine of shared access to essential facilities,
but the opinion is far from a clear articulation of that idea. The Court
apparently accepted defendants' argument that duplicate facilities
were impractical, but declined to extrapolate any broader generaliza-
tions from these facts. Although the Court chose to remedy the viola-
tion by ordering shared access to the facilities, it conceded that the
government's preferred remedy of dissolution (which would restore
the original three competitive facilities) might be necessary. 117
The Court's failure to establish a clear set of standards for liability
complicates the task of describing the doctrinal evolution after Termi-
nal Railroad, since it is unclear what cases to include in the chronol-
ogy. The next two Supreme Court decisions considered to be part of
the Terminal Railroad line are Associated Press v. United States1 8 and Ot-
ter Tail Power Co. v. United States.n 9 The Court analyzed both cases
under conventional antitrust doctrine. In Associated Press, the Court
held that an association of newspaper publishers violated antitrust law
by forbidding members from selling news to nonmember competi-
tors.120 Similarly, the Court in Otter Tail ruled that an electric power
utility's refusal to sell wholesale power or transmission services to a
competing municipal utility constituted monopolization. 121 Signifi-
cantly, the Court did not indicate in either case that it was following a
115 Id. at 410.
116 Id. at 410-11.
117 The Court apparently viewed dissolution as a more radical solution, albeit one that
might be necessary "unless one equally adequate can be applied." Id. at 409. Three years
later, the government was still advocating dissolution, but the Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that it had been excluded from the agreements reached by the railroads
to implement the original decree. United States v. Terminal RLR. Ass'n, 236 U.S. 194,
202-04 (1915). Dispute over the terms of the decree continued, however, and the case
came back to the Supreme Court nine years later. See Terminal R. Ass'n v. United States,
266 U.S. 17 (1924) (affirming the lower court's requirement of equal status between pro-
prietary and nonproprietary users of the terminal facilities). The twelve-year litigation his-
tory of Terminal Railroad illuminates a recurring problem in monopolization cases in which
imposing the remedy requires complex specifications of rights and obligations that survive
the original decision. In the final analysis, the government was probably correct (for the
wrong reasons) to insist on dissolution.
118 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
119 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
120 326 U.S. at 21-22.
121 410 U.S. at 377. At issue was competition for the market, as opposed to long-term
competition within the market, given that there was only one utility in each town and that
the particular markets were considered natural monopolies. Id. at 369-70.
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"doctrine" of mandatory access to essential facilities. 122 The lower
court in Associated Press did cite Terminal Railroad for the proposition
that there should be non-discriminatory access to the news pool, but
declined to explain the basis for this obligation.' 23 In any event, the
Supreme Court's opinion does not rest on any notion that the AP
news pool was an essential facility. 124 The Court seemed swayed by the
simple fact that a group of competitors acted in concert in refusing to
deal with others. Thus, Associated Press is best understood as the type
of collective organization cum boycott case that was routinely treated
as inherently suspect if not per se illegal. 125 Otter Tail more closely re-
sembles Terminal Railroad than Associated Press insofar as it involved a
facility that the Court explicitly characterized as a natural monopoly
(one that cannot be efficiently duplicated) and a regulated utility. It
is therefore puzzling that the Otter Tail Court never cited to Terminal
Railroad as relevant precedent,126 but chose instead to rely on general
monopolization doctrines to demonstrate that the use of monopoly
power to undermine competition is a violation of the Sherman Act. 127
With few exceptions, lower courts have adopted a conservative ap-
proach to imposing a duty to share essential facilities. Those who crit-
icize the broad scope of essential facilities are perhaps unduly
influenced by cases in which plaintiffs invoked the doctrine 28 and
overlook the fact that the success rate of these plaintiffs in the lower
122 Terminal Railroad was cited in Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Associated
Press, but only by way of illustrating an exception to the general remedial practice of disso-
lution in monopolization cases. See 326 U.S. at 25.
123 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.),
affd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Although Judge Hand couched his reference to Terminal Railroad
quite casually, Judge Swan vociferously challenged its application on the ground that Asso-
ciated Press did not have a monopoly on news gathering and was not otherwise subject to a
duty to serve all persons. Id. at 377 (Swan, J., dissenting).
124 See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 18.
125 In his opinion for the majority, Justice Black characterized Associated Press as being
similar to Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), see id. at 19,
which was generally interpreted as supporting a rule of per se illegality, see Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) ("[Group boycotts] have not been
saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances . . . ." (citing
Fashion Originators' Guild, 312 U.S. at 466-68)). Yet twenty-six years later the Supreme
Court repudiated the view that collective boycotts by trade organizations are per se illegal.
See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
296-97 (1985). Given the contemporary climate in which even exclusive trade associations
are considered benign, it is doubtful that Associated Press would be decided the same way
today. At a minimum, the Court would weigh more heavily the justifications for refusing to
deal, including protection of the benefits of organization and prevention of free-riding.
126 The Court cited Associated Press for the proposition that a practice may violate anti-
trust law even if it did not result in a complete monopoly. See 410 U.S. at 377.
127 Among other cases, the Court cited LorainJournal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951). See 410 U.S. at 377. The Court in Aspen Skiing also substantially relied on Lorain
Journal See 472 U.S. 585.
128 For a sample of such cases, see Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 96, at 1191-93.
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courts is very low.129 Terminal Railroad continues to provide the model
for finding an essential facility: a regulated utility or common car-
rier 30 already under a regulatory mandate to provide service cum ac-
cess to all who demand it.131 In nearly every case, the facilities are
capital assets that cannot be economically duplicated given the size of
the market-a communications network, a central terminal facility,
stadium, or energy transmission facilities.132
B. Elements and Issues
There is consensus on the basic elements of the essential facilities
doctrine. Most courts cite the Seventh Circuit's formulation from
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co.: "(1) control of the essential
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or rea-
sonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of
the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility."'133 This formulation is tolerably clear and largely unexcep-
129 To quantify this generalization, I conducted a Wesflaw search of all court of ap-
peals and district court opinions from 1980 through 2000 in which the court explicitly
addressed "essential facilities" claims. I tabulated district court cases appealed to the court
of appeals in the latter category. Of the twenty-eight court of appeals opinions, only five
held that there was even a triable issue as to the existence of an essential facility. Similarly,
in forty-three district court opinions, the court found at least a triable issue in six cases.
Eleven positive outcomes out of seventy-one is not a negligible result, but it hardly paints a
picture of a liability doctrine spinning wildly out of control. Indeed, most of the positive
outcomes are a symptom of posture, and reflect decisions to reject a motion to dismiss or
motion for summary judgment on the claim.
130 See, e.g., Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1990);
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). The existence of a
regulated utility is itself not a sufficient condition for forced sharing of facilities. See, e.g.,
City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1992) (ruling that a
utility had a valid business justification for refusing to provide the access demanded by the
city). Nor is the existence of a regulated utility even a necessary condition. See, e.g., Fish-
man v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
131 Of course, the classic utility/carrier obligation was to provide service to end users,
not competitors, under the assumption that the utility/carrier was a legally sanctioned mo-
nopolist (the usual natural monopoly model). However, in modern settings the monopoly
is rarely complete. Competitors often challenge the incumbentfor the market or challenge
the boundaries of an incumbent's monopoly. The former situation was illustrated in Otter
Tai4 see supra note 121; the latter formed the factual basis of the MCI case, in which MCI
and others sought entry into long distance markets that was predicated on access to switch-
ing facilities in AT&T's local exchange markets. See 708 F.2d at 1093.
132 See, e.g., MCI, 708 F.2d at 1093; Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93
(D.C. Cir. 1977). The most noteworthy outlier in this category is Gamco, Inc. v. Providence
Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952). In Gamco, the owner of a building
specially located and equipped for wholesale marketing of produce declined to renew the
lease of one of the tenants. Despite the district court's finding that other physical facilities
were available, the First Circuit found that "exclusion from an appropriate market or busi-
ness opportunity is actionable, notwithstanding substitute opportunities." Id. at 488 (citing
Associate Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
133 MC, 708 F.2d at 1132-33. While the court relied principally on Hecht, 570 F.2d at
992-93, subsequent decisions invariably cite MCI as the formative decision. See, e.g., Inter-
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tionable, requiring only a little embellishment. For expositional pur-
poses, it is convenient to rearrange the MCI formulation into four
questions: (1) what is a denial of use; (2) what is an essential facility;
(3) what is monopoly; and (4) what is feasible?
1. Denial of Use
The requirement that there be a denial of use seems almost trite
because a refusal to deal is what invokes the inquiry in the first place.
However, two subtleties of the essential facilities doctrine warrant dis-
cussion. First, this doctrine addresses refusals to deal with competi-
tors.1 3 4 Second, it is not always obvious what constitutes a denial. If
there is no absolute rejection but merely a refusal to deal on terms
deemed reasonable by the competitor, then the court must define
"denial" by constructing objectively reasonable terms of sharing.13 5
Following the lead of Aspen Skiing, courts treat unreasonable denial as
an affirmative defense and require the defendant to offer a legitimate
business justification for withholding access136 once the plaintiff satis-
fies its burden regarding the other elements.1 3 7
Treating the issue of unreasonable denial as a matter of affirma-
tive defense is difficult to reconcile with the idea that forced dealing
with competitors functions as an exception to the normal principles of
competition. This paradox epitomizes the confusion arising from the
Court's refusal in Aspen Skiing to articulate a bounded principle gov-
erning forced access to facilities. If instead of applying vague stan-
graph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Laurel Sand & Gravel,
Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 1991); Del. &HudsonRy., 902 F.2d at
179.
134 See, e.g., Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1356 (holding that the essential facilities doctrine
does not impose a duty to supply downstream buyers who are not competitors of the facil-
ity owner); Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc. 176 F.3d 500, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding
that plaintiffs who registered domain names with the defendant did not compete with the
defendant); Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 848 F.2d 976, 983
(9th Cir. 1988) (upholding an exclusive lease to a facility that precluded a lease to a
noncompetitor). The case law reiterates this basic principle so frequently that it is dismay-
ing to see noncompetitor plaintiffs continue to advance claims grounded in the essential
facilities doctrine. However, as any veteran of the tort system will tell you, it is exceedingly
difficult to discourage bogus claims.
135 See Del. & Hudson Ry., 902 F.2d at 180 (ruling that the question of whether an 800%
increase from the price previously charged was reasonable is a triable issue of fact).
136 See City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1367 (observing that the
essential facilities doctrine does not require a facility owner to relinquish his own use to
facilitate usage by a municipal competitor); Laurel Sand & Gravel, 924 F.2d at 543 (finding
legitimate business reasons for the defendant's refusal to grant trackage rights, which
would have altered the way defendant did business).
137 See Fla. Fuels, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 717 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 n.* (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(noting that "if plaintiff has shown that shared use is feasible, then the burden shifts to the
defendant to present its valid business reasons for refusing to allow the plaintiff access to
the essential facility" (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 600-01 (1985))).
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dards of monopolization the Court had approached the case from an
essential facilities perspective, it might have perceived the oddity of
couching a central element of the doctrine as an affirmative defense
rather than as part of the plaintiff's case in chief. Indeed, relegating
the issue of reasonableness to affirmative defense status obscures the
importance of focusing on the required terms of sharing. It is impos-
sible to judge fairly a defendant's termination of its previous joint ven-
ture without the benefit of a backdrop against which to determine a
reasonable sharing of revenues. This calls for some investigation into
what constitutes "fair" bargaining between two firms that may have
radically differing valuations of the relevant gains from trade.
2. Essential Facility
A threshold question is whether the term "facility" has any special
meaning, or simply refers to any set of assets controlled by the monop-
olist. Some commentators argue that essential facilities should be lim-
ited to physical structures or capital assets, as distinguished from
intangible goods such as intellectual property rights.'38 Although
most of the cases address access to physical structures such as a termi-
nal, 3 9 a stadium,140 a building,141 and transmission or other network
facilities,142 some concern access to intangible assets like customer
lists and databases. 143 Moreover, a number of concerted refusal cases
involve intangible assets, the most noteworthy being Associated Press.'4
Intellectual property cases might arguably warrant different treat-
ment in light of their unique potential to undermine investment in-
138 Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 96, at 1220; see alsoJames C. Burling et al., The Antitrust
Duty to Deal and Intellectual Property Rights, 24J. CoPe. L. 527 (1999) (arguing against a duty
to deal in the area of intellectual property, under either essential facilities theory or the
more general refusal to deal doctrine).
139 United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
140 Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
141 Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952).
142 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); MCI Communications
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
143 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, at 307 n.8; cf Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines,
Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying the essential facilities doctrine to
analyze access to an airline computer database).
144 326 U.S. 1 (1945); see also United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351,
1366 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying concerted refusal analysis to membership in multiple listing
service). While the Realty Multi-List court chose not to treat the listing service as an essen-
tial facility, one could hypothesize a different market environment in which multiple listing
is the dominant mode for real estate transactions. An analogous phenomenon occurs in
professional sports cases, where membership in a particular association is the only mode of
competing in the sport. It is worth emphasizing that the characterization of a facility as
essential is merely a necessary, and not a sufficient condition of a refusal to deal under my
proposed rule. Cf Mid-S. Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (denying franchise
for a new football team in the NFL under a boycott analysis rather than through essential
facility investigation).
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centives. 145  Protecting the exclusive use of intellectual property
through a recognized right not to deal with others is critical for en-
couraging owners to invest in innovation. But a similar concern
prompts protection of all property rights. An incentives problem is
created any time one firm is permitted to free-ride on a competitor's
investments, whether those investments are represented by tangible
assets or intellectual property. Forced sharing of an unpatented or
uncopyrighted gizmo undermines investment incentives to the same
degree as forced sharing of a patented or copyrighted widget. In the
former case, the owner's common law property right in the unpat-
ented widget is entitled to the same legal protection as the property
right in the patented gizmo for basically the same reason-to protect
settled expectations and the incentive to create wealth. Innovation is
merely one form of investment in wealth-creating activity. Regardless
of the form of the investment, the ultimate task is to accommodate
both the general laws of property and the special laws of antitrust.
Although courts have held that the owner of intellectual property
is not required to license his property to others, 146 this is really no
different from what the Supreme Court has affirmed about the obliga-
tion to deal generally. 147 In both cases, of course, the right not to deal
does not trump the antitrust laws. 148 Instead of basing a distinction
on the classification of the property right, it makes more sense to ex-
145 See Glazer & Lipsky, supra note 5, at 786; Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 96, at 1219.
146 See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1184-88 (1st Cir.
1994).
147 See supra note 1. If any distinction is to be drawn between intellectual property and
common law property, the structure of entitlements of the two types of property dictates
that the law should be more restrictive of forced sharing in the case of common law prop-
erty. After all, intellectual property rights are limited as to subject matter, scope, and dura-
tion in ways that common law property rights are not. Consider, for example, the right of
fair use, which circumscribes the exclusionary rights of copyright owners. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1994). Although common law exclusionary rights are sometimes limited by similar
commons-like claims on behalf of the public, such claims are generally limited to cases in
which compensation is paid for the privilege of access. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (ruling that compelling a property owner to devote a
public beach easement as a condition for receiving a building permit qualifies as a taking).
148 Indep. Sera. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1325. A subtle difference between intellectual prop-
erty and common law property concerns the burden of proof. Some courts have held that
the owner of a patent or copyright has a presumptively legitimate business reason for refus-
ing to license that is especially difficult to overcome. See, e.g., id. at 1329 (holding that a
plaintiff may not rebut this presumption by relying on subjective evidence that the pre-
ferred business reasons were a "pretext"); Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1187-88 (remarking
that a plaintiff has an "uphill" battle to rebut the presumption). On its face, this burden is
more onerous than the burden the Court applied in Aspen Skiing, where the mere presence
of market power was sufficient to shift the burden. See supra note 71 and accompanying
text. Perhaps these courts did not consciously establish a heavier burden for intellectual
property than for common law property, but either way this approach is unjustified. While
patent and copyright law generally do not compel sharing, this statutory practice should be
irrelevant to the application of antitrust law. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
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amine the underlying interest at stake. For instance, courts should be
skeptical about ordering a firm to share new technologies promising
only uncertain returns to the investing firm. Here the firm's invest-
ment incentives are especially sensitive to the firm's ability to capture
all of the upside return, particularly if it cannot share the downside
loss. 149 Similarly, the forced sharing of sensitive corporate informa-
tion, including customer lists and other proprietary information, may
entail deep intrusions into the normal confidentiality that drives the
competitive process. 150 Under these circumstances, a court should
force sharing of essential information only if there is no alternative
method of accomplishing the purpose of establishing workable
competition.
Whether "facility" should be narrowly construed is ultimately a
question of whether to pretermit inquiry into which facilities may be
characterized as "essential." Predictably, commentators who question
the essential facilities doctrine wish to skirt the essentiality issue, be-
cause it is not easily cabined by fixed definitions. If a facility were
characterized as essential because its absence precludes competition,
then the definition could encompass everything needed to run a prof-
itable business. The second element of MC!s formulation, however,
precludes such open-ended sharing: an essential facility must be an
asset that cannot practicably be duplicated or obtained from any
source other than the monopolist.
This issue is usually framed in terms of duplicating a facility con-
trolled by the monopolist, which suggests the existence of a unique
facility required to conduct business in the market. However, it is mis-
leading to think in terms of the uniqueness of a particular asset when
the emphasis should be on functionality. What is important is not
whether a particular asset owned by the monopolist can be duplicated
but whether the specific economic uses performed by the asset can be
34, 63 (D.C. Cir.) (remarking that Microsoft's proffered copyright justification for exclu-
sionary practices "borders upon the frivolous"), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
149 See Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 10-18 (2000). Significantly, the perverse incentive effects from sharing occur on
both sides: the firm that is forced to share has less incentive to invest in new technologies,
and the firm that is permitted to share is discouraged from innovating as well.
150 The sharing of information concerning a firm's operations and customers rarely
arises in conventional antitrust cases, but does emerge in the regulatory context. For in-
stance, telecommunications access to local network facilities includes access to operational
databases and information. Interestingly, however, this information is not treated as "pro-
prietary" within the meaning of the Telecommunications Act, which establishes a special
standard of "necessity" for sharing of "proprietary" information. See Implementation of
Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696,
3882-3887 (1999).
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replicated. 51 The practicability issue is primarily a matter of econom-
ics-whether it is possible for a firm to obtain the required facility-
functionality at a cost consistent with viable competition. In rare cases
duplication may be impossible or legally prohibited, but I have found
no case in which duplication was physically impossible. The closest
one comes is the original Terminal Railroad case in which the Court
adverted to geographic features that made it difficult to duplicate the
required facilities. On the other hand, legal obstacles to duplication
would include patents, licensing, or franchise requirements that pre-
clude independent duplication. 152 Again, however, I have found no
case in which a court cites legal restraints in any form as the basis for
finding an existing facility essential.
3. Monopoly
A fundamental premise of the essential facilities doctrine is that
courts should confine forced sharing to cases in which there would
otherwise be demonstrable harm to competition, not merely to competi-
tors. Thus, a threshold condition is the existence of monopoly power,
possessed either by a single firm or by a group of firms acting in con-
cert. The criteria for determining monopoly power in the essential
facilities context are the same employed generally under § 2: there
must be a defined market and a determination that the firm or group
has the power to raise prices and/or exclude competition. 153 How-
ever, the essential facilities case implies a unique kind of monopoly
power. The conjunction of monopoly power with the impracticability
of duplicating the facilities-the second element of the standard for-
mulation-logically implies a natural monopoly.154
The natural monopoly requirement presents a conflict between
the doctrine's principle of sharing essential facilities with competitors
and the conventional lesson of natural monopoly--that competition
is neither sustainable nor desirable in a natural monopoly market. Yet
courts and commentators generally ignore this conflict. One notable
151 See Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 544-45 (4th Cir.
1991) (discussing alternatives to shared use of a facility, including the resale of services
provided by the facility owner).
152 The patent example illustrates the importance of considering functionality rather
than the physical asset itself. A patent might block replication of a particular type of input
without blocking replication of alternative inputs. For instance, chemical patents that
block competitors' duplication of a particular chemical entity do not foreclose the use of
other chemical entities to achieve the same purpose. This strategy is commonplace in the
pharmaceutical industry, where different drug companies hold competing but not block-
ing patents that are designed to achieve the same therapeutic purpose.
153 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
154 See IIIA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, 1 771c, at 176; Lipsky & Sidak, supra
note 96, at 1220. Admittedly, little case law explicitly supports this proposition because
most courts simply ignore the question. But see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,
948 F.2d 536, 544 n.10 (9th Cir. 1991).
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exception is Judge Posner, who has criticized the essential facilities
doctrine for this reason.155 While grudgingly acknowledging the doc-
trine's acceptance in Terminal Railroad, Otter Tail, and his own circuit's
leading decision in MCI, Judge Posner argued for its demise on the
ground that a natural monopolist should not be obligated to share its
monopoly profits via access to its facilities with competitors. 156
Judge Posner is correct that it makes no sense to force the shar-
ing of monopoly facilities simply to effectuate a sharing of monopoly
rents with other firms. However, the pertinent question is whether
forced sharing of facilities deemed to be naturally monopolistic can
serve a legitimate competitive purpose beyond the mere sharing of
rents. Notwithstanding Judge Posner's contrary view, the answer is
"yes, sometimes."
First, in some cases the essential facilities doctrine is properly in-
voked to prevent a monopolist from leveraging its power from one
market into another by withholding access to an input that is needed
in the second market.'5 7 In such cases the input is assumed to be
severable from the monopolist's market; the fact that the facility may
have economies of scale such that replication is impracticable does
not imply that all goods to which the facility is an input are naturally
monopolistic.
Second, forced sharing might be the only vehicle for testing
whether a market is naturally monopolistic. As Judge Posner himself
argued in an early critique of natural monopoly, the claim that com-
155 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406,
1412-13 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.).
156 Id. at 1412-13; see also Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 96, at 1220 (asserting that natural
monopolies are inherently the province of regulators).
157 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 544-46; Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health &
Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1990). The conventional "Chicago School" argument
that monopoly profits cannot be increased by leveraging, see, e.g., PosNER, supra note 3, at
173, is misleading to the extent that it claims that a monopolist will not use leveraging to
expand or secure monopoly power. A monopolist may not be able to increase its short-run
profits by leveraging, but it can certainly increase expected long-run profits by foreclosing
competitors in the tied-good market if those competitors would threaten its monopoly. See
Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, Tying Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory,
32 RANDJ. ECON. 52 (2001); Michael D. Whinston, Tying Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Am.
ECON. REv. 837 (1990). The most obvious contemporary example, albeit a contested one,
is Microsoft's attempt to use its monopoly of PC operating systems to gain control of the
Internet browser market that threatened its monopoly. See United States v. Microsoft, 253
F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's finding
of monopolization through conduct that included, inter alia, the tying of its Internet
browser to the Windows operating system to foreclose the "middleware" threat to its oper-
ating system monopoly), cert. denied, 122 S. CL 350 (2001). More generally, a monopolist
might seek to position itself in the second market to expand into sectors of the economy
that offer growth potential unavailable in the monopoly market. For instance, telephone
and cable television providers are keen to use their monopolies in local distribution of
voice and television to gain entry into the Internet distribution market given the greater
potential for growth.
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petition is not sustainable should always be open to challenge and not
impeded by regulatory entry limits.1 58 The same caution ought to ap-
ply in the antitrust context; courts should not lightly infer that the
apparent conditions of natural monopoly preclude antitrust expecta-
tions of competition.
The theory of natural monopoly is a static concept that inade-
quately accounts for the dynamic conditions of the market. Econo-
mies of scale and scope that define a natural monopoly may prove
quite ephemeral with changes in technology or economic circum-
stances. Many markets once thought to be naturally monopolistic,
such as local and long distance telecommunications markets, are now
considered naturally competitive. However, such changes do not oc-
cur overnight, and must sometimes wait to be triggered by develop-
ments outside the market.
Again, telecommunications comes to mind. Beginning in the
early 1970s and culminating in the breakup of the Bell System in
1984, competition was introduced into the long distance telecommu-
nications market when regulators realized that prior assumptions
about the market's natural monopoly structure were no longer
valid.159 Needless to say, the new regime of competition took some
time to take hold. Indeed, even after the breakup of Bell, it was more
than a decade before AT&T's share of long distance revenues de-
clined from ninety percent to less than fifty percent.160 This glacial
process of transforming the local telecommunications markets began
anew following Congress's official declaration in 1996 that such natu-
ral monopoly markets must be opened to competition.1 61 The con-
ventional wisdom in both the local and long distance markets was that
a critical component of the transformation process was to allow new
entrants to share the facilities of market incumbents. A new entrant
cannot replicate a complete set of network facilities overnight; indeed,
for some types of facilities it might never be practicable.
Critics of essential facilities doctrine would probably dismiss the
telecommunications example as inapt because these industry transfor-
158 Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 612
(1969).
159 The history has been recounted a thousand times, but on the salutary principle
that an author's first duty is to cite himself, see Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered:
AT&T and the Changing World of Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517 (1988) (review-
ing GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL (1987)).
160 In 1984, the year of its breakup, AT&T accounted for 90.1% of total toll service
revenues; it first fell to below 50% in 1996, the year Congress terminated the antitrust
decree. COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE
SERVICE 10-14 tbl.10.8 (2001), available at http://v.fcc.gov.Bureaus/CommonCarrier/
Reports/FCC-State Link/IAD/trend801 .pdf.
161 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. V 1999) (forbid-
ding states from imposing barriers to competitive entry into local exchange service).
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mations are the business of legislators and regulators, not the courts
and antitrust enforcement agencies. Yes and no. In some cases-and
telecommunications is probably such a case-regulators are in a bet-
ter position than courts and antitrust enforcement agencies to impose
sharing requirements because determining the nature and degree of
the sharing required will entail complex specification and ongoing
monitoring of the terms of sharing. Still, the division of responsibility
between courts and antitrust enforcement agencies and regulators is
neither as sharp nor as clear as some suppose. Virtually all major mo-
nopolization cases require some degree of monitoring, or "regula-
tion." The breakup of AT&T was intended to be a clean structural
remedy that would foster an atmosphere of competition without regu-
lation. Indeed, the government's case was implicitly premised on the
inadequacy of regulation up to that point. Yet enforcement of this
supposed nonregulatory solution produced what many characterized
as a rival regulatory regime concerned with enforcing, interpreting,
and modifying the terms of the decree.1 62 Judge Greene, who admin-
istered the AT&T consent decree, became known as the "telecom
czar, 1 63 a label used to suggest, inaccurately, a regulatory power com-
parable to that of the FCC. Regulation by antitrust decree is problem-
atic to the extent that it gives courts and enforcement agencies a
regulatory role they are ill-equipped to handle. 64 However, in a case
like AT&T, some degree of "antitrust regulation" is inevitable given
the complex and changing character of the industry. Unless one is
prepared to say that the antitrust laws should not be concerned with
complex cases, the accompanying issue of regulation cannot be
avoided.
On the flip side, it does not follow that regulatory enforcement
hassles will evaporate in the hands of regulators. Indeed, shifting re-
sponsibility completely to regulators is an illusory long-term goal if
forced sharing requires complex specification of terms and ongoing
oversight, because the courts will inevitably be dragged into the ensu-
ing controversies over applicable principles. Indeed, this is precisely
what has happened in the communications field with regard to shar-
ing of network facilities and broadband Internet access facilities. 165
In short, the need for regulatory supervision is a concern com-
mon to antitrust and regulation. In either forum, the costs of such
162 See, e.g., MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 343-48
(1992).
163 See, e.g., Leslie Cauley, Telecom Czar Frets over New Industy Rules, WALL ST.J., Feb. 12,
1996, at Bi.
164 This was one of the concerns expressed by congressional sponsors of the 1996 Tele-
communications Act. See 141 CONG. Rxc. S7881-82, S7884-85 (daily ed. Jun 7, 1995) (re-
marks of Sen. Pressler).
165 See infra Part 1V.C.
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supervision must be weighed against the benefits accruing from
forced sharing. The essential facilities doctrine provides a framework
for assessing those costs under the element of feasibility.
4. Feasibility of Sharing
Those courts that have addressed the issue of feasibility appear to
have regarded it as a matter of physical arrangements, 166 but this is
rarely a substantial problem independent of the economic question of
whether it makes sense to force the sharing of assets. Thus, the judi-
cial conception of feasibility must be broadened. It is not the feasibil-
ity of providing access so much as the feasibility of administering the
terms of access that should orient the court's focus. Antitrust com-
mentators are alert to the difficulty of determining the appropriate
terms of access and for that reason have chastised courts for capri-
ciously imposing the duty in the first place. Interestingly, some com-
mentators believe that this problem of prescribing and enforcing the
required access can be solved through a regulatory program to en-
force the court's mandate. Phillip Areeda, for example, suggested
that the availability of regulatory expertise mightjustify cases like Otter
Tail.167 However, the suggestion that courts should impose access
more freely in cases when there is a regulatory "backup" to enforce
the terms of the order is dubious. Prescribing and enforcing the
terms of dealing may be a regulator's job, but enforcing the mandate
of antitrust courts is not. A decision by a court directing two regulated
firms to deal with one another cannot become a mandate to the regu-
lating agency to implement the terms of the decision for the obvious
reason that the court has no jurisdiction over the agency simply be-
cause the agency has expertise in the matter. It is up to the court to
enforce its own mandate and to specify the appropriate terms.
Moreover, even if courts could somehow transfer the burden of
enforcing their mandates to regulatory agencies, they should be dis-
couraged from fashioning mandates that they are not themselves re-
sponsible for administering. This loophole would allow judges to
externalize a cost of their decisions, thereby undermining the very
purpose of the feasibility element. Under such circumstances, a court
may not be appropriately sensitive to how implementation details in-
form the scope of the duty to deal.
Finally, one should not assume that placing regulators in charge
is always a reliable solution. Commentators and courts sometimes be-
come preoccupied with the antitrust-regulatory divide and ignore sub-
stantive policy questions. Does forced cooperation among rival firms
166 See, e.g., Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 545 (4th Cir.
1991).
167 See Areeda, supra note 24, at 853.
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promote competition or merely divide monopoly rents? If the latter is
true, it should not be the business of antitrust or regulation. Does
forced sharing require a sufficiently high level of regulatory interven-
tion so as to make the game not worth the candle? Same answer.
C. Essential Facilities on the Information Superhighway
Consider two recent controversies generated by the excitement
over obtaining access to the new information superhighway. The first
controversy concerns the implementation of a congressionally man-
dated requirement that incumbent local telephone carriers grant
competitors access to their local exchange facilities. The second con-
flict involves a similar issue regarding whether (and how) to force tele-
phone and cable companies providing broadband Internet service to
allow competitive Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to use their trans-
port facilities. I shall finesse most of the details because they add
more confusion than illumination to the basic argument I want to
make. However, a little background is necessary to frame the access
issues.
1. Access to Local Telephone Exchange Networks168
In 1996, Congress developed a two-tiered approach to promote
greater competition in telecommunications service markets. First, it
allowed the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) to enter long distance
service markets, from which they had been barred by the 1982 AT&T
antitrust consent decree.169 Second, it opened local telephone ex-
change markets to competition.170 The first action was not revolution-
ary, but the second one was. Opening local markets to competition
had not occurred to anyone in 1974 when the government filed the
antitrust action, nor in 1982 when the courts dismembered the Bell
system. The Justice Department and nearly everyone else regarded
local telephone markets as a naturally monopolistic industry in which
competition was not sustainable, and hence not economically effi-
cient. Times change, and sometimes ideas change with them. In one
168 For an overview of the structure and regulation of local exchange networks, see
INGO VOGELSANG & BRIDGER M. MITCHELL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION (1997).
169 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. V 1999). Congress granted BOCs permission subject to an
elaborate set of conditions. The effect of these conditions was to tie BOC entry into long
distance markets (in-region, interLATA service) to the establishment of arrangements for
new entrants seeking to access BOC local exchange facilities. The BOCs have yet to satisfy
those conditions in most of their local markets. As of April 17, 2002, BOC applications to
provide in-region long distance service had been approved for only eleven states. SeeWIRE-
LINE COMPETITION BuREAu, FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, RBOC APPLICATIONS TO PRO-
VIDE IN-REGION, INTERLATA SERVICES UNDER § 271, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
Common_Carrier/in-regionapplications/ (last modified Dec. 20, 2001).
170 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-53 (Supp. V 1999).
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of the most remarkable paradigm shifts in modem industrial history,
Congress simply ignored the natural monopoly model.' 71
Of course, there is a significant difference between a concept and
a reality. The paradigm of local competition was not even remotely a
reality when it emerged as an accepted concept. At the time, there
was fledgling competition for business services, but it was exceedingly
modest when Congress was considering the open competition provi-
sions of the 1996 Act. Against this backdrop, the congressional legisla-
tion had to accomplish two objectives: (1) ban states from continuing
their traditional opposition to competition; and (2) make it practica-
ble to ensure that competition could flourish. Meeting the first objec-
tive was easy; the latter has proved more difficult than Congress could
have imagined. Congress envisioned that new competition in local
markets could follow three paths: (1) full facilities-based entry, where
new entrants overbuild the existing local network; (2) resale by new
entrants of incumbent carrier services; and (3) some mixture of new
facilities combined with the selective use and resale of particular in-
cumbent network components. Each model would be facilitated by
requiring mandatory interconnection, resale, and most controver-
sially, access to and resale of unbundled incumbent local exchange
carrier (ILEC) network components.172
It must have seemed so simple to a Congress accustomed to issu-
ing orders in the manner of Jean Luc Picard of the USS Enterprise:
"make it so, number one." And the FCC, a dutiful if not always fully
informed number one, tried to make it so. First, the agency decreed
171 An interesting challenge to the intellectual historian would be to trace the change
in the perception of natural monopolies in this industry. In the case of long distance
service markets that were opened to competition gradually in the 1970s and 1980s, the
shift in the monopoly paradigm was a process of natural erosion in which each successful
entry into some part of the market paved the way for a more general entry. Ultimately,
there was no basis for arguing that monopoly was natural. In the case of local exchange
markets, however, there has been scant erosion of monopoly service, and thus no opportu-
nity to demonstrate that the old natural monopoly model is no longer valid. After the
breakup of AT&T, competitive access providers (CAPs) did establish a modest presence in
local markets. Initially, CAPs merely provided a link between large commercial users and
long distance carriers. Many have now morphed into CLECs providing fully switched local
exchange service. VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 168, at 28-30. However, this evolu-
tion is largely a product of the post-1996 period during which the assumption of a natural
monopoly in local switched service was put to rest by Congress. Most remarkably, by the
time Congress began deliberating on the bill that emerged as the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, the idea of a natural monopoly played no role in the debate. Even the Bell Oper-
ating Companies, which inherited the residue of AT&T's monopoly after the breakup of
AT&T, were not defending that monopoly on the terms that AT&T itself had argued less
than two decades earlier when it resisted the breakup sought by the Justice Department.
See Defendants' Third Statement of Contentions and Proof at 189-91, United States v.
AT&T, Civil Action No. 74-1698 (Mar. 10, 1980). Perhaps some ideas just die of old age,
though in this field there is a lot of evidence to the contrary.
172 See 47 U.S.C. § 251.
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that the basic network components, ranging from operational support
systems (OSS) to the switches to the local loop, be unbundled and
made available on demand, regardless of whether a CLEC had alter-
native sources of supply, or even self-supply. Second, the FCC pre-
empted state regulatory discretion over pricing to the extent of
mandating that unbundled network elements be priced on the basis
of "forward looking" incremental costs (dubbed "Total Element Long-
Run Incremental Cost" (TELRIC)).173
The coupling of Congress's directive and the FCC's enthusiasm
to "make it so" has been a communication lawyer's dream come true.
Almost every one of the FCC's rules was contested, though the princi-
pal challenges were to (1) the FCC's requirement that all ILEC net-
work elements be offered CLECs, (2) the FCC's preemption of local
regulators, and finally (3) the substantive merits of TELRIC as a cost
methodology. In Iowa Utilities Board, the Supreme Court upheld the
majority of the FCC's rules, including the agency's authority to pre-
empt state regulators on pricing standards.' 74 However, two critical
issues remained. The first was the issue of the FCC's cost standards
for use in pricing access, which was not then before the Court.175 The
second residual issue was the scope of mandated access to the local
network facilities, which the Court remanded to the FCC for further
justification.176
Unsurprisingly, Congress was vague about the details of its un-
bundled access requirements. With regard to what elements of the
local network must be unbundled, the legislation specified separate
standards for proprietary and nonproprietary network elements. As
to the former, Congress directed the FCC to consider whether access
is "necessary";177 with respect to the latter, the FCC was to consider
whether lack of access "would impair the ability of the telecommunica-
tions carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to of-
fer."'78 Applying these loose standards, the FCC compiled a list of
seven specific network elements to be unbundled and offered to
CLECs.' 79 The ILECs challenged the list, arguing that the "necessary"
173 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions, supra note 92, at 15,515.
174 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
175 In January 2001, the Court granted certiorari to hear the Eighth Circuit's disap-
proval of parts of the TELRIC model. See Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 531 U.S.
1124 (2001).
176 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 392.
177 47 U.S.C. § 251 (d) (1).
178 Id. § 251 (d) (2).
179 Subsequently the FCC added the high frequency portion of the loop-used to pro-
vide broadband service-to the list of network elements the ILECs must provide on an
unbundled basis to CLECs. See Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced
Telecomms. Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecomms. Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,912 (1999) [hereinafter Line Sharing Order].
2002] 1219
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and "impair" criteria should be understood to incorporate a frame-
work similar to the essential facilities doctrine, which articulates a
more limited standard than the FCC applied in compiling its list.
While the Supreme Court did not decide whether the necessary and
impair standards incorporated the essential facilities doctrine, it
agreed with the ILECs that the FCC was bound "to apply some limiting
standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act, which it has simply
failed to do." 180
On remand, the FCC adhered to its original list. The agency lim-
ited its expansive interpretation of "necessary," but found that most of
the required elements could be nonproprietary and could be justified
under the "impair" standard. As to that standard, the FCC essentially
adopted an "all-things-considered" test that considers relative costs,
timing, and quality, among other factors, to determine whether com-
petition would be "diminished. '" 181 Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's
suggestion that the essential facilities doctrine might provide a limit-
ing framework for considering the scope of access, 182 the FCC refused
to employ the doctrine, insisting that it limited the FCC's discretion to
a degree that Congress never intended.183
The FCC's conclusion that Congress did not contemplate applica-
tion of the essential facilities doctrine is debatable. Perhaps Congress
did not specifically intend to invoke the essential facilities doctrine,
but nothing in the statute precludes its application. What is certain is
that the use of the essential facilities doctrine would in fact have lim-
ited the scope of the Commission's power to mandate access. For ex-
ample, the FCC demanded that competitors receive access to ILEC
switching facilities, yet competitively supplied switches are in wide-
spread use and can be readily self-supplied. 18 4 Whether or not the
essential facilities doctrine requires that the facility be strictly a natural
monopoly, its application is restricted to circumstances when it is "im-
practicable" to duplicate the facility or obtain it from any source other
180 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388. For an approving discussion of the Court's decision
and a criticism of the FCC's refusal to adopt an essential facilities doctrine test for sharing,
see Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Un-
bundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 471-75 (1999).
181 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3712-30 (Nov. 5, 1999).
182 See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 388.
183 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions, supra note 92, at 15,531. The
FCC also refused to engage in a market-by-market analysis of the necessary impairment
criteria, instead fixating quickly on a national standard requiring a single list of network
elements to which access was required. Recently the FCC has initiated a proceeding to
reexamine the entire framework and rules for unbundled access and has suggested more
flexible, and more limited, requirements. In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 2001 WL 1636623 (F.C.C.) (proposed
Dec. 20, 2001).
184 See Hausman & Sidak, supra note 180, at 487-88.
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than the monopolist. This is manifestly not the case with switching
facilities.
The scope of access issue cannot be divorced from the terms of
access, in particular the pricing of unbundled network elements
(UNE). On some set of terms, at some price, the ILECs would pre-
sumably be willing to provide whatever the CLECs wanted, unless they
were legally constrained from doing so. This is not some crude trade-
off between principles and money; in business the principle is money,
and all else being equal a firm should be indifferent to whether it is
earned from consumers or competitors. The elements of essential fa-
cilities were previously discussed in the context of determining
whether there has been a denial of sharing. In this particular contro-
versy, Congress attempted to resolve that question by prescribing that
the price of the UNE should be nondiscriminatory, based on the
"cost" of the network element, and could include a "reasonable
profit."1815 Although one could not expect more detailed specifica-
tions from Congress, this direction is vexingly indeterminate. In this
context, does the term "cost" refer to incremental cost or fully distrib-
uted costs? Is the cost to be measured by embedded book costs or
reproduction costs?
Thus the access mandate has been a dream come true for econo-
mists and accountants as well as communications lawyers. Battalions
of each have been deployed to devise different costing methodologies.
The FCC has ruled that the appropriate measure of cost to be used in
setting the price of access is forward looking, TELRIC.186 The goal is
to replicate the terms that would prevail in a maturely competitive
market where prices are ultimately driven down to the long-run incre-
mental cost of service.' 8 7 In the long run, incremental costs will cover
the costs of asset replacement and the common costs of the enter-
prise, including accounting profit. The ILECs have challenged this
standard as confiscatory insofar as it will force them to lease network
elements at less than their historic costs (the assumption being that
the replacement costs for the same functionality will be less than the
book value of the assets being leased).
The FCC's pricing methodology is still in dispute. After the Su-
preme Court's approval of the FCC's authority to determine pricing
methodology, the Eighth Circuit addressed the merits of its forward-
looking cost model and was troubled by its basis in hypothetical rather
than actual cost. Notwithstanding this misgiving, the Eighth Circuit
approved the central idea of basing prices on forward-looking incre-
185 47 U.S.C. § 252(d) (1) (Supp. V 1999).
186 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions, supra note 92, at 15,499.
187 Id. at 15,499, 15,817, 15,846.
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mental costs and rejected the ILECs' contention that rates had to re-
flect historic book costs. 18 8
Commentators have debated the pricing issue endlessly.1 89 Be-
cause another opinion on the merits is not needed, I shall suppress
the temptation to offer one. The basic arguments for and against the
FCC's incremental cost standard reprise an ancient debate in utility
ratemaking over whether the "fair value" of a utility's rate base should
be based on historic cost or reproduction cost.190 The original de-
bates featured the utilities clamoring for a reproduction cost measure
and the regulators arguing for historic costs. In the current telecom-
munications context, the carriers are arguing for reproductive costs191
and the FCC advocates historic costs. 192 The transposition reflects the
economics of the time; current technological changes generally por-
tend reproduction costs that are lower than historic costs, translating
into lower prices. 193
The appropriate pricing standard and the scope of unbundled
access are only important insofar as they illustrate the old adage that
God is in the details. 194 How much access? What particular facilities
are truly essential for competition to flourish? What is a fair and rea-
188 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom.
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 531 U.S. 1124 (2001).
189 See, e.g., Sidak & Spulber, supra note 63, at 1084 n.8, 1085 n.10.
190 See 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 35-40 (1970). The "fair
value" controversy in utility rate regulation more or less died when the Supreme Court
ruled that the Constitution did not require the use of any particular costing methodology.
See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 607 (1944). However, this
has not dissuaded opponents from arguing that the TELRIC formula is unconstitutionally
confiscatory. Thus far courts have evaded the question for reasons of ripeness. See, e.g.,
Iowa Utils. Bd., 219 F.3d at 754; GTE S. Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517, 531 (E.D. Va.
1998), affd on other grounds, 199 F.3d 733 (4th Cir. 1999).
191 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions, supra note 92, at 15,499,
15,858 (listing ILEC arguments for historic cost recovery). Several ILECs have argued for
an "efficient component pricing rule" based on an opportunity cost measure that takes
into account the incremental cost of the input plus the opportunity cost that the incum-
bent carrier incurs when the new entrant provides the services. Id. at 15,859. Such a stan-
dard would cover the historic cost of supplying the inputs, except when facilities-based
competition through cheaper or superior facilities limits the incumbents' ability to recover
their embedded costs. See Sidak & Spulber, supra note 63, at 1098.
192 The FCC rejected the historic cost standard on the ground that a competitive mar-
ket would not necessarily allow recovery of embedded costs. Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions, supra note 92, at 15,857-859. The FCC rejected the opportunity
cost model (the incremental cost of providing the service input, plus the revenue foregone
by the ILEC when the service is supplied by the competitor) on the ground that it utilized
existing ILEC retail prices that are not necessarily based on real cost (i.e., they include
elements of subsidy as well as monopoly rents that have not been removed by regulation).
Id. For a criticism of the FCC's analysis, see Sidak & Spulber, supra note 63, at 1091-98.
193 See 1 KAHN, supra note 190, at 39-40.
194 A variant of the adage is that the devil is in the details. A quick Google search
demonstrates that each rendition is popular, raising the interesting theological question of
whether, contrary to the teachings of the Book of Revelation, God and the devil reside in
the same place.
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sonable price to charge for those facilities? While no one ever sup-
posed that these questions were easy, Congress did not fully
appreciate that the sheer complexity of these matters would bog down
the entire scheme in a quagmire of administrative and judicial litiga-
tion. Indeed, five years after the basic framework was enacted into
law, the most basic elements of access are still unresolved. Meanwhile,
major new entrants like AT&T are questioning whether the game is
worth the candle and have reduced reliance on incumbent facilities,
in favor of deploying their own facilities. 195 This tends to undermine
the case for forced access in the first place. It is another angle of the
incentives point mentioned earlier. Just as forced sharing may under-
mine the investment incentives of the firm ordered to share, perhaps
it undermines even more the incentive of the firms seeking to share to
invest in their own facilities.
2. Sharing Broadband Internet Access' 96
If the controversy over sharing telephone facilities teaches cau-
tion in requiring forced sharing of facilities, then the recent demand
for access to broadband Internet access facilities demonstrates that
not everyone is internalizing the lesson. Broadband access, whether
through cable modems, digital subscriber lines (DSL), fixed wireless,
or satellite transmission, is the next critical step in the evolution of the
Internet.19 7 These advances will transform the Internet into an all-
purpose pipeline for consumers and business alike. Virtually every
major ISP has some broadband strategy. Providers with their own net-
work facilities-most notably the local telephone carriers and cable
operators-have a head start in the race to provide broadband service
to the extent that they can use their own facilities (with necessary
modifications 98 ). Providers without existing local facilities have two
195 AT&T, for example, has pursued a strategy of deploying a combination of cable
and fixed wireless facilities to provide a foundation for local exchange telephone services,
along with Internet access and video services. See Sam Masud, AT&T's Project Angel Spread-
ing lings?., TELECOMMUNICATIONS, May 1999, at 9-10.
196 For a useful recent report on this controversy, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
TECHNOLOGICAL AND REGULATORY FACTORS AFFECTING CONSUMER CHOICE OF INTERNET
PROVIDERS (2000), available at http://vw.gao.gov/new.items/d0193.pdf.
197 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability
to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third
Report, FCC 02-33 (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/at-
tachmatch/FCC-02-33A1.pdf. The popular use of the term "broadband" connotes an ill-
defined range of through-put capacity. The FCC uses two terms to describe broadband-
'advanced" service or opportunity and "high-speed" service or capability. The first de-
scribes speed greater than 200 kbps in both upstream and downstream directions, the sec-
ond as comparable speed in one direction. Id. para. 7.
198 For example, local telephone carriers can adapt conventional local loops for DSL
service, but this limited option is generally ineffective for providing broadband service to
users beyond three miles from a central office. To extend the service to subscribers be-
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options: build their own facilities, or lease access from other broad-
band providers. Needless to say, the first option is prohibitively ex-
pensive for most ISPs. A new local wireline network seems out of the
question. Most markets already have two wireline providers-the lo-
cal telephone carrier and the local cable operator. With this wire ca-
pacity already in the ground, it is unlikely that anyone would invest in
another line. Fixed wireless facilities (including satellites) are a
cheaper alternative, but here again economies of scale and scope
favor existing providers. 199 An ISP seeking only to provide Internet
access faces competition from cable operators and telephone carriers
that can offer services such as conventional voice telephony, video,
and Internet, as a package.
It is a small wonder that ISPs that are unaffiliated with facilities-
based broadband providers are anxious about their futures. Whether
their anxiety translates into a legal entitlement to the facilities needed
to compete with integrated providers like AT&T or AOL Time Warner
is another question. As with telecommunications network access, the
open access controversy has dimensions that extend beyond the scope
of this Article. So again, I finesse the God-like (or devil-like, depend-
ing on your perspective) details.
The access arguments have been advanced in different forums
and in different forms. Most of the public controversy has focused on
demands by ISPs to get open access to cable modem facilities. Access
to telephone lines used to deploy DSL service, secured in 1999, was
more or less taken for granted until local exchange carriers began to
complain of the regulatory asymmetry between cable modem and DSL
server. The demands for access to cable modem facilities gained spe-
cial salience with AT&T's acquisition of TCI in 1999. As a conse-
quence of acquiring TCI, AT&T became not only the largest cable
operator in the country, but also a dominant provider of broadband
Internet access service via contracts with ISP and portal provider Ex-
cite@Home. 200 The acquisition involved the transfer of TCI's cable
yond the present reach requires a large investment in modifying the local loop-by con-
structing remote hubs connected by optical fiber to the central station. Cable modems
also have the disadvantage of being a shared service such that the speed of the connection
is diminished in proportion to the number of subscribers. On the respective capabilities of
DSL and cable modem, see, for example, Jason Fry, The Broad Jump: As High-Speed Internet
Lines Become Easier to Get, The Path Is Clear for All Sorts of New Services, WALL ST. J., June 26,
2000, at R22.
199 For a list and description of the various types of terrestrial and satellite wireless
systems being deployed, see Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 15
F.C.C.R. 20,913 paras. 42-59 (2000), and Peter Rysavy, Wireless Broadband and Other Fixed-
Wireless Systems, NETWORK COMPUTING, at http://wwv.networkcomputing.com/netdesign/
bbl.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
200 In October, 2001, Excite@Home filed for bankruptcy and terminated its Internet
service contracts with AT&T, which then switched its broadband subscribers to its own
facilities. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
1224 [Vol. 87:1177
ON REFUSING TO DEAL WITH RIVALS
franchises to AT&T, which local cable franchise authorities were re-
quired to approve. Access proponents immediately perceived an op-
portunity to use the local regulatory forums to secure forced access as
a condition of local approval for the transfer. Most franchise authori-
ties declined to require access, though a few equivocated, promising
to take up the question when the franchises were up for renewal.
However, several authorities ordered access as a condition of approv-
ing the franchise transfer, including regulators in Portland and Mult-
nomah County.20 1 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
this condition on the ground that broadband transport is not a cable
service within the scope of their franchise authority but is instead a
telecommunication that Congress barred them from regulating.20 2
Subsequently other courts invalidated local regulatory efforts to re-
quire open access. 203
These courtroom defeats appear to have foreclosed local regula-
tion as a source of forced access. Federal regulation remains unset-
tled at the time of this writing. The FCC recently sent a strong signal
that it will not impose access requirements on cable broadband prov-
iders.20 4 Time Warner, the second largest cable broadband provider
in the United States, has agreed to provide open access as a condition
of the FTC's approval of its merger with AOL.20 5 Equally important,
other major cable broadband providers, such as AT&T, Cox and Com-
cast, have voluntarily accepted access and begun field trials to test
Facilities, FCC 02.77 (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/at-
tachmatch/FCC-02-77Al.pdf.
201 See AT&T, Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000).
202 Id. at 879.
203 In MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001), the lower
court treated Internet access as a cable service, but found that the Communications Act
preempted the open access condition, id. at 361; the Fourth Circuit approved the preemp-
tion holding without determining whether the service was telecommunications or cable, id.
at 365. In Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000), the
court also sidestepped the classification issue by finding compulsory access tantamount to
forced speech and therefore a violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 698.
204 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facil-
ities, supra note 200. The FCC ruled that a cable modem service is an "information service"
not a cable service. Id. para. 33. The FCC initiated further rulemaking to determine the
regulatory implications of this classification, but it hinted rather clearly that mandated
access is not likely. Id.
205 See In reAm. Online, Inc. & Time Warner, Inc., 2000 WL 1843019 (F.T.C.) (2000).
Briefly, the consent agreement requires that AOL Time Warner enter into agreements for
broadband access with unaffiliated ISPs. In its largest markets AOL Time Warner may not
offer cable modem service until such service is offered by Earthlink pursuant to an FTC-
approved access agreement. Then, within ninety days after AOL Time Warner offers ser-
vice, it must negotiate with at least two other unaffiliated ISPs and obtain FTC approval.
Failing such approved agreements, the FTC is empowered to appoint a Monitor Trustee to
negotiate with them on behalf of AOL Time Warner, to be then approved by the FTC. In
smaller markets served by AOL Time Warner the same ninety day condition applies. Id.
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shared use among multiple ISPs. 20 6 Their cooperation has not fore-
closed the debate over forced access, however, because the precise
scope and terms of voluntary access have yet to be determined. In-
deed, for those seeking the protection of legally mandated, common-
carrier type access, reliance on voluntary and selective access is a risky
business.
The forced access issue has been complicated by the question of
regulatory fairness. In 1999 the FCC ruled that ILECs providing DSL-
based broadband service are required to give CLECs unbundled ac-
cess to the high frequency portion of the local loops used to provide
DSL service. 207 The resulting regulatory asymmetry has been chal-
lenged recently by the ILECs, who insist that cable broadband provid-
ers either be subject to the same open access rules or that the ILECs
be freed from the regulations. 20 8 This plea for regulatory parity is un-
derstandable. It is difficult to justify the regulatory asymmetry be-
tween telephone company DSL service and cable broadband,
particularly since cable broadband is currently dominant in the
market.209
The question of whether the regulatory playing field should be
leveled by raising the turf under cable providers or by lowering the
ground under local exchange carriers should be governed by the
same considerations posed earlier with respect to local exchange tele-
phone facilities. 210 That is say, it should be guided by the framework
206 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, supra note 200, para. 28.
207 In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Ca-
pability, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,912 (1999). Under 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (Supp. V 1999), only com-
peting local exchange carriers are entitled to unbundled network access. However, ISPs
that are not CLECs or that do not purchase transport services from CLECs can take advan-
tage of the Commission's separate Computer III regulations, which require the Bell Oper-
ating Companies to give enhanced service providers (which now includes all ISPs)
nondiscriminatory access to the same facilities the BOCs use to provide Internet services.
See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of En-
hanced Services, 10 F.C.C.R. 8360 (1995) (summarizing rules after remand from court of
appeals).
208 See, e.g., Regulation of ILECs, Right-of-Way Policies Cited as Barriers to Broadband Service
Deploymen4 TELECOMM. REP., Oct. 1, 2001, at 6-8, 22 (summarizing industry comments in
FCC's general inquiry on the status of advanced services deployment). Industry positions
and arguments can be found in comments filed in two FCC inquiries, FCC CC Dkt. No. 98-
146 (general inquiry on status of advanced services), and FCC Gen. Dkt. No. 00-185 (in-
quiry concerning high speed access over cable and other facilities) available online at
http://v.cybertelecom.org/regulat.htm.
209 Cable modem service currently enjoys a 2:1 advantage in market penetration,
though DSL is reported to be growing faster. See Deployment of Advanced Telecommuni-
cations Capability, 16 F.C.C.R. 15,515, para. 6 (2001).
210 The FCC recently began two parallel rulemaking proceedings to review broadband
access-one concerned with cable broadband, the other with telephone wireline broad-
band. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, supra note 200; Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
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of the essential facilities doctrine. Fast access to the Internet is lauded
as the key to the next generation of Internet wonders.21' Confronted
with such a vision, it is disappointing, but not surprising, that the ana-
lytical nuances concerning regulation of competition and respect for
property rights are obscured by rhetorical appeals about the "urgent"
public need to make the Information Superhighway even more
super.21
2
3. Network Effects and Access
The idea that the Information Superhighway may justify special
measures is grounded in the notion that communications technolo-
gies are characterized by network effects, meaning that expansions of
the network yield benefits to users that exceed the value recognized
by the "-nth" user, thus producing a positive externality.213
over Wireline Facilities, FCC 02-42 (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-02-42A1.pdf.
211 See, e.g., Frangois Bar et al., Access and Innovation Policy for the Third-Generation In-
terne4 24 TELEcomm. POL. 489, 490 (2000). Although the authors' argument purports to
rest on the limited competitive alternatives for broadband transport (in particular, the
dominance of cable), the thrust of their plea for regulating access appears remarkably
short term. Left unexplored are the difficulties of such a regulatory task; after four years of
regulating local exchange telephone access, it is still not a reality in most markets.
212 Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture
of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rtv. 925 (2001), present a more nuanced
case for open access. More nuanced, but not quite convincing. Lemley and Lessig con-
struct their argument for open access around a principle of engineering design called
"end-to-end" architecture, which holds that the "lower-level network layers" (read, trans-
port) should accommodate multiple independent applications. See id. at 930-31. This
principle is intuitively sensible, but one must be careful about applying a principle of such
generality to the specific issue of access. The access issue is not one of network design, but
network economics. Lemley and Lessig argue in favor of a move from the end-to-end
principle to a principle of competitive provision of network access to ensure that access to
network content will continue to be as unconstrained as possible. See id. at 934-38, 943-46.
They view basic transport-the broadband facility-and Internet access as inherently sepa-
rate products that are being illegally tied together, with the effect of eliminating consumer
choice. They apparently derive this assumption from the adventitious fact that many cable
operators provide Internet access through a separate entity. However, there is no reason
why Internet access cannot be an integral part of other services provided by cable opera-
tors. Indeed many cable operators do so. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to
the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, supra note 200, paras. 23-27. Whether the
integration of transport and access service occurs through contract or corporate structure,
the basic question remains the same: whether the economic conditions of the industry
justify forbidding firms to integrate the separate functions of content and transport in
order to maximize the choice of distribution channels for unintegrated content providers.
These conditions are best modeled within the framework of the essential facilities doctrine.
In all events, the analysis of the access issue gains no purchase from abstract theorizing
about the appropriate architecture of Internet technology. Framing the question as one of
Internet network architecture only diverts attention from the issues of economic policy by
implying that some unique technological principle is driving the analysis.
213 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 96. A network effect does not necessarily imply an externality,
and when it does it may not always imply a positive one. The externality exists only to the
20021 1227
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Legal and economic scholars have lavished attention on network
effects, no doubt inspired by the dramatic growth of information and
communications technologies that provide the classic models for such
effects.214 Of course, the idea of network effects is not new. In the
case of actual networks, such as telecommunications, positive external-
ities have been commonplace from the earliest times. Network effects
have been an element of telecommunications policy since the time of
Theodore Vail, the redoubtable architect of the Bell System, and the
inspiration for the enduring universal service policy that is historically
linked to him.2 1 5 That policy has been heavily criticized for its com-
plex and inefficient patchwork of pricing distortions designed to sub-
sidize certain use classes, 216 but that debate is irrelevant here. The
important point is that there is no simple or obvious connection be-
tween promoting network expansion and forced sharing among net-
work firms. Admittedly, some form of interconnection or
compatibility among network rivals is probably necessary to prevent
monopolization.2 1 7 That was the assumption underlying the first anti-
extent that the market fails to take into account the increasing returns from network ex-
pansion-or decreasing returns in the case of negative externalities such as network con-
gestion costs. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133, 133-34. Moreover, the public policy pre-
scription even for positive externalities is not obvious. Historically the policy prescription
has been some form of government intervention to promote network expansion. This is
the economic premise of universal services, though it is a questionable premise. See Glen
0. Robinson, The "New" Communications Act: A Second Opinion, 29 CONN. L. REV. 289,
323-25 (1996). In terms of competitive policy-antitrust or regulatory network effects
do not yield any unequivocal prescription, however.
214 The seminal modem paper on network externalities analyzes communications net-
works. See Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5
BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 16 (1974). However, the basic concept has application well
beyond traditional, physical networks. For an excellent survey, see Mark A. Lemley &
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
215 Vail actually intended for "universal service" to promote the idea of a single, inte-
grated system (the Bell System, of course)-not a set of internal subsidies designed to
expand service, which is the contemporary meaning of universal service. MILTON L. MUEL-
LER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAK-
ING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 97-98 (1997).
216 See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL
SERVICE? 23-25 (2000); Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and "Telecommunications Services,"
Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE
J. ON REG. 211 (1999). One should distinguish between the economic externality of pro-
viding increased connectivity to network users on the one hand, and the broader social
benefits of providing universal access to modem communications on the other hand. In
the age of the Information Superhighway, the latter appears to be the more salient pur-
pose. It is, however, a problematic purpose that warrants closer scrutiny than it has re-
ceived. See Robinson, supra note 213, at 320-28.
217 This assumes that interconnection or intercompatibility is necessary either to over-
come barriers to entry that are created by positive network effects, see GregoryJ. Werden,
Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST LJ. 87
(2001), or to prevent the natural tipping of the market in favor of firms with an established
subscriber base.
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trust case against AT&T,218 and many commentators derive the same
lesson from the Microsoft case nearly ninety years later.219 However,
to the extent that these cases rely on some special characteristic of
network economics, they also rest on the elements of essential facili-
ties doctrine. This argument remains unchanged by the assumption
of positive network effects. 220 Regardless of whether network exter-
nalities exist, the immediate question is how to optimally promote
competition and network expansion.
The element of competition is particularly important, for if one
relaxes the assumption that competitive rivalry is the best means to
ensure promotion of the network, then network externalities are irrel-
evant to the policy issue at hand.221 Unfortunately, it is easy to be
218 As part of an antitrust settlement with the Department of Justice in 1913, AT&T
agreed, inter alia, to interconnect its long distance with competing independent carriers
for local telephone service. GERALD W. BROCE, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
154-58 (1981) (discussing the "Kingsbury Commitment," which laid out the terms of the
settlement).
219 There is a growing consensus that Microsoft illustrates the relevance of network ef-
fects. See, e.g., Lemley & McGowan, supra note 214, at 501-07; Howard A. Shelanski &J.
Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHL L. REv. 1, 59 (2001);
Werden, supra note 217. But what that implies in terms of Microsoft's liability or the ap-
propriate remedies is unclear. Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals offered a
short essay on the importance of network effects, but could find no antitrust lesson to
derive from them. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49-50 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 350 (2001).
220 The precise character of the relevant network externality requires more specifica-
tion than it has received in the commentary. If there is an external benefit from ex-
panding access to the last mile of transport, it does not derive from expanding the number
of connections in the network. A single access provider will allow a user to reach the
Intemet, and thereby claim all of the connections that it facilitates. Competitive access
thus does not itself increase the number of connections that a user can make in cyber-
space. The most one can say is that anything that facilitates deployment of more broad-
band will create a positive externality by increasing the demand for broadband
applications, thereby increasing the supply. This is a chicken-and-egg externality. SeeJEF-
FREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIEs 16-17 (2001)
("There may be no incentive for any firm to supply the complementary product (the 'egg')
until there is a sizable user set for the base product (the 'chicken')."). Note, however, the
critical assumption that open access will promote greater deployment of broadband. If
one believes that forced access will reduce investment incentives, as argued above, the
assumption of positive network effects provides an argument against, not for, open access.
221 In telecommunications markets, competition was historically perceived to be in-
compatible with achieving netvork effects, in accordance with Vail's theory that network
externalities required a single system, and that a single system implied a single provider.
See MUELLER, supra note 215, at 96-99. This perception conflates network externalities
with natural monopoly. It is certainly possible that a market could be characterized both
by positive network effects and natural monopoly (economies of scale or scope over the
range of the market). However, these two phenomena are not identical. See Lemley &
McGowan, supra note 214, at 488-90. That much is demonstrated by the modern repudia-
tion of natural monopoly in telecommunications services. Of course, this does not imply
that every component of the network can be competitively supplied, in which case there
would be no basis for an essential facilities doctrine. However, assuming that the scope of
the natural monopoly qua essential facility is limited to only certain elements required for
network functions, we have no reason to believe that monopoly is superior to competition
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swept away by the enthusiasm for expansion, and to ignore the condi-
tions for promoting effective competitive rivalry.
CONCLUSION
Refusals to deal are the bane of antitrust and the source of end-
less confusion. Some of this confusion is avoidable when the refusal is
incident to another category of prohibited activity. For instance, every
price-fixing arrangement, tying arrangement, or exclusive dealing
agreement could also be characterized as a refusal to deal, but doing
so would be superfluous. However, the real mischief occurs when a
refusal to deal is treated as an independent offense. The gravity of the
mischief increases when the offense lies in refusing to deal with com-
petitors, a classification that threatens to put antitrust at war with
itself.
We are reminded ad nauseam that the duty to deal is supposed to
be exceptional, primarily by courts that are nonetheless enforcing the
duty. The exception is typically cast in terms of a firm, or group of
firms, exercising monopoly power and seeking to aggrandize that
power by refusing to deal with other firms. Unfortunately, inexact
methods of measuring market influence, and a vague conception of
what it means to aggrandize power, result in a very uncertain scope to
the exception. To make matters worse, there is an unsettled question
of whether either of these metrics is assessed differently for a group of
firms as opposed to a single firm.
The principle that a refusal to deal may be justified by valid busi-
ness justifications is deceptively complex. In the classic farmers model
of competition, individual producers are oblivious to each other and
there is no rivalry among firms. But that model has little relevance to
the world of antitrust (and some might say it has no relevance at all).
The world of antitrust is inhabited by competitors who are rivals, an-
tagonists. When Intel's Andy Grove famously pronounced that "only
the paranoid survive,"222 he was not expressing a farmer's concern
about general market conditions; he was expressing fear about what
his rivals were doing. In this world there is a very fine distinction be-
tween conduct that is permissibly rivalrous and conduct that is imper-
missibly exclusionary.
in producing the conditions that promote positive network externalities. In short, if we set
aside Vail's mistake that equated one system with one firm, the issue of promoting network
effects boils down to a question of what economic conditions are most conducive to effi-
cient innovation which is the driving force of network expansion. The existing evidence
advocates in favor of competition. See Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and Deployment of
New Technology in U.S. Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 85 (surveying litera-
ture on the deployment of new technology under conditions of competition and monop-
oly in the field of regulated telecommunications).
222 ANDY S. GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVIVE (1999).
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The difficulty of defining legitimate business justifications for re-
fusing to deal with a rival is complicated by conditional refusals. Here
the difficulty is not simply a matter of defining business justification in
general terms, but ascertaining the specific terms on which it is rea-
sonable to compel the deal. In Aspen Skiing, the Court deemed it un-
reasonable for a firm to stop dealing with its rival on the same terms
that the firms had agreed to in the past.2 23 The Court did not bother
to ask why the previous terms of dealing were so eminently fair that
they could not be reasonably altered. Perhaps Aspen Skiing is limited
to cases in which one firm has halted a previous course of dealing, the
assumption being that prior arrangements furnished a continuously
reasonable basis for dealing. However, this is a precarious assump-
tion. Reasonable business firms do not voluntarily enter into arrange-
ments that bind them indefinitely to the same set of terms, and
reasonable courts should not force them to do so.
Antitrust commentators recognize the problematic character of
an enforced duty to deal. Ironically, some of these commentators
have misdirected their fire at the essential facilities doctrine, which is
only one application of the more general duty to deal. Perhaps this is
because the essential facilities doctrine is a "doctrine" that squarely
defines a duty to deal in affirmative terms. That, however, is its virtue,
not its vice. Critics' complaints that the doctrine is too broad miss the
point that all things are relative. In his widely cited critique, Areeda
labelled the essential facilities doctrine an "epithet in need of limiting
principles."224 This phrase could certainly be widely applied to anti-
trust law. What makes this statement so peculiar in the essential facili-
ties context is that, under present practice, the alternative to the
essential facilities doctrine is not a carefully prescribed set of princi-
ples governing the duty to deal, but the amorphous and untheorized
"it-all-depends" principle followed in Aspen Skiing. The Court explic-
itly refused to apply or even recognize the essential facilities doc-
trine.225 Whether it would have reached a different result under an
essential facilities analysis is a matter of speculation, but also unimpor-
tant beside the more general principle. Regardless of the outcome,
the analytical framework of the doctrine certainly would have pro-
vided more "limiting principles" than general monopolization doc-
trine. Surely that is why the Supreme Court has resisted embracing
essential facilities-not because it is too broad, but because it is too
limiting. While the Court continues to duck the question of whether
there is such a thing as an essential facilities doctrine, the lower courts
have formulated a set of criteria, cum principles, that place acceptable
223 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-11 (1985).
224 Areeda, supra note 24, at 841.
225 Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.
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limits on the duty to deal. These criteria are not so tight as to pre-
clude a few false positives (enforcing a duty when it is inappropriate),
but no man-made legal rule can meet a standard of perfection. A
review of the lower court opinions indicates that lower courts are
quite conservative in their application of the essential facilities doc-
trine. Certainly lower courts have been far more reluctant to impose a
duty to deal than has the Supreme Court, applying the more general
criteria of concerted action in restraint of trade or monopolization.
As a simple matter of prediction, there is little reason for opti-
mism. Like so many areas of common law (and antitrust is an area of
common law notwithstanding its statutory architecture), there is a cyc-
lical oscillation between fixed rules and amorphous standards-what
Carol Rose referred to in a different context as "crystals" and
"mud."226 Today, antitrust is buried deep in the mud cycle. A score
of years ago we at least had a clear binary choice between the rule of
reason and per se liability rules. 227 However, the clarity of that choice
has been obscured by the recent emergence of the "quick look" rule.
More recently the "it all depends" principle infiltrated antitrust law
again to create what Justice Souter recently described as a "'sliding
scale"' approach. 228 Because it cannot get much muddier from here,
perhaps we are on the verge of a movement back to crystals. If that
occurs, a good target for clarification will be refusals to deal.
226 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 577-78
(1988) (discussing the oscillation of courts applying property law doctrines between pre-
cise rules-"crystals"-and general standards-"mud").
227 The clarity of that choice was always deceptive because some cases featured a mix
of both liability rules. Tying arrangements are a conventional example; the per se illegality
of tying presupposes a kind of rule of reason analysis of what packages of products consti-
tute a tying arrangement. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33-35
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Merger cases are an example the other way: the liabil-
ity rule is a rule of reason, but one that generally excludes the most fundamental of rea-
sons, efficiency trade-offs.
228 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (quoting PHiLLip E. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAw 1507, at 402 (1986)).
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